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Thesis Introduction
This thesis is composed of three essays on international economics with a particular focus
on international trade and the effects of the globalization phenomenon.
The first chapter consists in an empirical paper investigating the effects of international
trade on the high skilled workers’ wages introducing two new heterogeneities: skill ubiquity
and sector complexity. Skill ubiquity describes the degree of specialization of the worker.
It expresses the number of her potential employment sectors and their complexity. The
complexity of a sector indicates how many skills are required in that sector and how much
those skills are specialized. Ubiquity and complexity indexes are constructed based on
US workers’ university majors and their employment sectors. Thanks to the indexes’
construction method I am able to identify which are the most ubiquitous skills, i.e. the
skills that are the most common and least specialized at the same time, and which are the
most complex sectors, i.e. those which require the greatest number of different and highly
specialized skills. Next, using the data on US workers’ wages and on US imports and
exports volumes, I study the effects of international trade on workers’ wages. Introducing
those new heterogeneity I find the following results. Increases in exports in more complex
sectors are associated with an increase of the wages of all workers and in particular of
the wages of highly specialized workers. The overall effect of exports in the least complex
sector is negative for the least specialized workers. Increases in imports have an opposite
effect than increases in exports on workers’ wages. Employment in a more complex sectors
increases a worker’s wage and owning a less specialized majors increases the worker’s wage
at a decreasing rate with respect to her employment sector complexity.
The second chapter of the thesis consists in a theoretical model explaining the dynam-
ics behind the empirical results found in the first chapter. I build a general equilibrium
monopolistic competition model with multiple manufacturing heterogeneous sectors each
needing a different number, and type, of specialized workers. Sectors differ in the number
and the type of specializations they require for production and workers differ by their skill
ubiquity. The sectors needing more, and at the same time more specialized, workers will
be more complex than the others, the specializations required by more, and at the same
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6time less complex, sectors will be more ubiquitous. I allow only for partial mobility of
workers across sectors according to the sectors’ complexity and the workers’ specializa-
tion. By means of the model I study globalization impact on wages and most importantly,
how this effect would change according to the each worker’s specialization. The model
suggests that when globalization shocks sectors differing in complexity, it induces differ-
ential effects for skilled workers. When the least complex sector is the only sector which
is open to trade it would lead to a rise of the wage of high specialized workers and a fall of
the least specialized ones’ in highly specialized workers abundant country and, when the
ratio of low specialized-high specialized workers is high enough, the model results suggest
that such decrease will affect negatively also the most specialized workers. In contrast,
when the most complex sector is open to trade, it has a positive effect on both the most
and the least specialized workers. Therefore, the results of the model are in line with the
empirical results of the previous chapter.
The focus of the third chapter of the thesis is on firm’s production location decision
in a globalized world. In this paper we provide theoretical explanation of the recent
phenomenon of reshoring, i.e.: moving previously offshored business activities back to
origin country. Thanks to access to a unique survey of American reshoring firms, we
provide evidence for the importance of quality and access to technology innovation as main
drivers of reshoring decision. Based on this evidence we build a dynamic heterogenous
firm model in which firms decide where to locate prodution and choose the quality of
produced variety. Apart from pioneering theoretical explanation of reshoring, this paper’s
contribution is the introduction of the quality choice into a dynamic offshoring model. If
a firm decides to offshore its production, it will face lower payroll costs yet higher quality
production costs, thus, in a dynamic setting, quality plays an additional role into the firm’s
location decision since possible cost savings from offshoring can be offset by quality-related
mark-ups decreases. We find that the most productive firms will choose to produce in
the developed domestic country in each period, the second most productive firms will
instead offshore in the first period, exploit the rise in profits due to low wages and return
in the next period in the domestic country in order to further increase the quality of their
product. Finally the model predicts that the least productive firms will remain abroad
both the periods. This paper is joint work with Marta Paczos (University of Bologna).
Part I
Globalization and Wages: The role
of Sector Complexity and Skill
Ubiquity
7

9Introduction
From Ricardo (1817) passing through the Heckscher-Ohlin model (1991) and for all the
past decades, the economists tried to understand the effects of trade on workers. A lot
has been said and studied but still, our knowledge on the effects of trade on workers and
on their wage is far from complete. What we know, is that we don’t know enough.
The international trade literature has addressed this issue distinguishing between high
skilled and low skilled workers and searching in the data the regularities which would have
proven the rightfulness of the theoretical models. Unfortunately the results were mixed,
and the international trade literature still has not been able to properly address the ques-
tion to whether the classical models work and to fully uncover the effects of globalization
on workers.
More specifically, there are mixed evidences on the effects of trade in the developing coun-
tries, with a tendency to assess that they go in the opposite direction with respect to the
standard theory (for a full review of this literature see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)),
meanwhile, there are just few and mixed evidences that international trade played a role
in the developed countries (see Haskel et al. (2012) and Han et al. (2012)).
While the great majority of the literature has always focused on the contrapposition be-
tween high skilled and low skilled workers and has tried to find the regularities using those
two groups, my aim is to go beyond this division introducing new forms of heterogeneity
which I prove to have an important role in this problem.
Hence, what I want to tackle with the first two chapters of my thesis is this tendency of
the literature to underestimate the heterogeneity of workers within those two groups and,
more specifically, the heterogeneity of the effects of international trade within high skilled
workers.
If we look at the labour literature, the wage determinants have been at the center of
the attention for long, one of the most interesting finding for the purpose of my analysis, is
that the variation of wage appears to be the highest within the high skilled workers group
and, in the latest forty years, there has been an increase in residual unexplained wage
inequality in this group (Lemieux and Johnson (2006), Juhn et al. (1993)). Furthermore
this literature finds that different university degrees imply different wages for the workers
(Lemieux (2014)) but it is not proposing a theory to explain those differences.
In addition to that, we know that sectors are connected together in complex ways not only
by the simple material inputs used, but also by the different knowledges, hence workers,
that are used and we know that within the same sector there is a big unexplained wage
inequality among workers (see Helpman et al. (2010a,b) and Hidalgo et al. (2007) ).
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Hence, just like connecting all the pieces of a puzzle, the first two chapters of the thesis
aim to disclose the, until now unknown, elements that affects the effects of international
trade on workers. I do so introducing new heterogeneities at the sector’s and at the
worker’s level, which are able to embody all the mentioned information.
Differently from the literature, the number of years of schooling is not the most important
attribute that matters when studying the effects of trade on the workers, instead, also
which type of knowledge the worker acquires and how she can use it inside the economy
matters. Thus, I introduce a new horizontal heterogenity among high skilled workers,
each worker possesses a knowledge which is then used by those sectors in the economy
which require that particular knowledge. Hence, introducing this heterogeneity among
high skilled workers allows to introduce also a new heterogeneity among the sectors in the
economy. Sectors using different types of knowledge differ from one another and differ on
how they react to international trade.
More in particular, each worker possesses a knowledge which could be more or less specific,
this specificity, here onwards specialization, will affect the number of the different sectors
in which he is able to work and the types of each of these sectors. This implies that,
when facing a shock such as an increase in international trade, those workers will react
differently. For example a worker highly specialized will not be able to be hired in a lot
of different sectors and at the same time she is difficultly replaceable, hence, the way
in which she will face an increase in trade will differ from a worker lowly specialized
who is able to be hired anywhere but has to compete with a higher number of workers.
Contemporaneusly, firms in each sector require different number and different types of
knowledges in order to be able to produce. Some of the sectors require a higher number
of different knowledges and, at the same time, more specialized ones, those sectors are
therefore more complex and there is no reason why they should react to external shocks
as the less complex ones. Hence, the complexity of each sector will matter when studying
the effects of international trade. More specifically, when a shock affects a sector in which
several types of workers are hired, it will affect the wage of those workers and it will
also affect all those sectors sharing some of the types of workers with the shocked sector.
Following this reasoning, a positive shock in one complex sector will induce a rise of the
wage of the several types of workers hired in that sector, this rise will also negatively
affect all those sectors sharing some of the types of workers with the more complex sector.
While the former sector will exploit the positive effect of the shock, the latter will not
benefit from the shock but it will experience a rise in wage of those “shared” workers in
order to prevent them to leave for the higher payed sector. In the end this positive shock
will affect differently the workers and the sectors according to respectively how much
11
specialized and how much complex they are.
Summarizing, the first two chapters of my thesis study the effect of Globalization on
the high skilled workers’ wages taking into consideration the role of Sector Complexity
and Skill Ubiquity respectively through an empirical analysis and a develop of a new
theoretical model. I introduce these new sources of heterogenity among sectors and among
workers and I study how they impact both the determination of wage and the effects of
globalization. The complexity of one good reflects both how many specific knowledges
that good requires in order to be produced, and how much specialized those knowledges
are, while the ubiquity of the skills of one worker reflects the capability of that worker’s
knowledge to be used in different sectors taking also into consideration how much complex
those sectors are. From the empirical investigation I find that increases in exports in
more complex sectors are associated with an increase of the wages of all workers and in
particular of the wages of highly specialized workers. The overall effect of exports in the
least complex sector is negative for the least specialized workers. Increases in imports
have an opposite effect than increases in exports on workers’ wages. Employment in
a more complex sectors increases a worker’s wage and owning a less specialized majors
increases the worker’s wage at a decreasing rate with respect to her employment sector
complexity. The theoretical model in the second chapter suggests that when globalization
shocks sectors differing in complexity, it induces differential effects for skilled workers.
When the least complex sector is the only sector which is open to trade it would lead
to a rise of the wage of high specialized workers and a fall of the least specialized ones’
in highly specialized workers abundant country and, when the ratio of low specialized-
high specialized workers is high enough, the model results suggest that such decrease will
affect negatively also the most specialized workers. In contrast, when the most complex
sector is open to trade, it has a positive effect on both the most and the least specialized
workers. Therefore, the results of the model are in line with the empirical results of the
first chapter.
The first part of the thesis is organized as follow.
The next section describes the literature related to the first two chapters, after that the
first chapter will describe the empirical analysis and the second chapter will illustrate the
theoretical model
Related Literature
The concept of sector complexity has been firstly introduced by Hidalgo et al. (2007), in
their paper they define more complex goods the goods which require a higher number
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of “abilities” in order to be produced. In detail, they compute the probability that a
country produces a good given that it produces the other goods and from that probability
they infer the complexity of that particular good. In order to construct the indexes for
sector complexity and for the ubiquity of an ability, they use the exports data for several
countries. Using the export information, they are able to identify the goods produced
in each country and they construct a network linking all the sectors according to their
complexity. Then they use the information about sectors’s complexity in order to predict
the GDP growth of each country. Differently from that paper and the subsiquent papers
such as Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011), my empirical analysis provides a more specific
channel through which I can derive a sector complexity, I do not refer to general abilities,
instead, I construct the complexity index using the workers’ specific skills which I proxy
with university majors. Hence, the workers’ skill ubiquity is a new concept and by using
this novel formulation of complexity, I am analyizing both the wage determinants and
globalization impact on the labor market. Moreover, differently from the other papers
studying complexity, my focus is on the wage determinants and the effects of globalization
on wages and not economic growth.
In particular, in the first chapter of the thesis, I use the American Community Survey
(ACS) dataset, for the years 2009-2013, from the United States Census Bureau to obtain
measures of skill ubiquity and sector complexity in order to study the effects of those
variables on the wages of high skilled workers.
The first two chapters of the thesis are also related with the papers studying the
effects of globalization on wage inequality between high skilled and low skilled workers.
The literature on this topic is quite vast and not yet conclusive since there is still mixed
evidence on this issue. As Haskel et al. (2012) state: “There is only mixed evidence that
trade in goods, intermediates, and services has been raising inequality between more- and
less-skilled workers”. One possible explaination for those findings is that, when comparing
high skilled wages with low skilled ones, we forget that high skilled workers are strongly
heterogeneous, hence, we must study more deeply the effect of globalization within the
high skilled workers category. For this reason, I focus on the high skilled workers’ wages
introducing the mentioned new heterogeneities which allow a different approach to the
analysis of the effect of international trade on workers’ wages.
The empirical analysis is also related with a very recent series of paper which are
studying the effect of Globalization on wages taking into consideration the type of task
each worker. More specifically Ebenstein et al. (2014) and Baumgarten et al. (2013) focus
on the effect of offshoring on workers finding that the type of task each worker performs
is relevant for understanding the effect of globalization on her wage. My intention is to
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analyze the heterogeneous impact of globalization using finer and more detailed indexes
of worker skill heterogeneity.
Recently Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Bombardini et al. (2012) have introduced
skill dispersion and talent diversity as new determinants of comparative advantage of a
country. They prove that the presence of workers with different levels of ability matters in
the determination of a country’s comparative advantage. Hence, this literature introduces
into the trade debate the role of the diversification of abilities and so my study, proposing
a novel method to identify the presence of diversified knowledges, attributes a further role
to this newly discovered channel.
Furthermore, the first chapter of the thesis is also related to the literature studying
the residual wage inequality. More precisely the determinants of wages are still not fully
known, even though more and more papers (such as Helpman et al. (2010a,b) Redding
et al. (2013)) are trying to study this issue with more attention. Hence, my paper,
introducing sector complexity and the ubiquity of the university majors as determinants
of wages, delivers a new approach to this issue. The results suggest that those two new
heterogeneity are significant in the determination of the wage.
Finally the empirical paper is also related with the literature studying the role of
the field of study on wage. More specifically the papers such as Lemieux (2014) and
Arcidiacono (2004) find different returns for different university majors. Hence, with this
paper, I study the field of graduation linking it with its ubiquity, thus, with the capability
of that specific knowledge to be used in several sectors. Hence I observe how this new
heterogenity has a role on the effect of globalization on workers’ wages and on wages’
determinants.
The second chapter of my thesis describes a newly developed theoretical model which
is able to explain the empirical results found in the first chapter. The theoretical paper is
also related to the recent theoretical papers studying comparative advantages under new
perspectives. Costinot et al. (2013) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) focus on the relation-
ships between skilled workers, tasks and comparative advantages. Differently from them I
allow for some factors, the specialized workers, not to be substitutes but instead comple-
ments to each other. Moreover I consider a monopolistic competition framework allowing
only for partial mobility of workers across sectors according to the sectors’ complexity and
the workers’ specialization. I find that some of their results emerge as particular solutions
in my setting. My model implies an increase in wage inequality when there is an increase
in trade of the least complex good in the country with relatively more workers with the
highest specialization. The channel through which I model the complexity of one good is
the labor usage in that sector. I introduce a new horizontal heterogeneity among the high
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skilled workers, i.e. the specialization, and I compute the complexity using the number
of different types of specializations required for the production.
Finally the second chapter of the thesis could be related to the specific factor model
and to the H-O model but differs from them in some crucial elements. In particular my
theoretical model differs from those models both by the type of competition considered
and also by the definition of the characteristics of the factors. In detail, my model is able
to distinguish, and to rank, the different factors used in the economy according to the
complexity of the sectors in which they are used. More in detail, the specific factor model
considers a perfect competition scenario in which each specific factor is used by one sector
only, thus, there is not any difference between these factors in terms of the number of
sectors in which they are used. Instead, my model is able to add a further dimension to
differentiate the factors used. Introducing the skill specialization and sector complexity
I am able to study the issue with a different approach. In the H-O model goods differ
in the intensity of the usage of the different production factors, but, assessing that one
good requires more of a particular factor than another one does not tell anything about
the relationship between those factors, they are in fact “equal” in the sense that their
role in the market will only depend on the overall endowments and not on the charac-
teristics of each of them. Instead my model is able to add a new source of heterogeneity
making it possible to understand how the different factors differ intrinsicaly from one
another. Moreover while the H-O model predicts changes in wages due to changes in
prices, my model does not consider this channel also because there is scarce evidence that
the changes in the ratio of high skilled goods’ prices-low skilled goods’ prices did actually
happen and that they are able to explain the increased inequality between high skilled
and low skilled workers. Finally, my model assumes monompolistic competition instead of
perfect competition setting. This difference leads to another important difference in the
determination of the wages. In fact, in my model, the wages of the high skilled workers
are not associated with their marginal productivity in the sectors, but, instead, they are
the outcome of the equilibrium between demand and supply of specialized workers. This
implies that, workers with different degree of specialization will have a different “bargain-
ing power” since they can move across different number and different types of sectors
according to their specialization.
Chapter 1
Globalization and Wages: The role
of Sector Complexity and Skill
Ubiquity
The Empirical Analysis
1.1 Dataset Description
I use the American Community Survey dataset from 2009 to 2013. The dataset contains
information about each individual such as age sex race years of schooling, wage, sector
in which she is employed and university major. I use only the observations of workers
for which we have information on university major since I am interested in wages of high
skilled workers. Sectors are expressed using the NAICS classification, in particular, in
order to avoid dealing with differently defined sectors, I use the four digit naics classifi-
cation for each sector.
Each year the number of observations then amount to about 300’000, with a total of 173
different university majors, 166 different sectors and 1,542,989 observations. The dataset
is a repeated cross section. I report the distribution of both sectors and majors in the
appendix A1.
I combine this dataset with the information about Exports and Imports from the Census
Bureau Database - Foreign Trade Division, in particular I use the data from 2008 to 2013.
Finally I combine the cited datasets with the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and
the Economic Census from which I obtain the information about total output of sectors
which is proxied by the total value of shipments from 2008 to 2012.
15
16 Chapter 1. Empirical Analysis
1.2 Complexity-Ubiquity Variables
I use the ACS data in order to compute the complexity indexes for each sector and
the ubiquity ones for each university major applying the reflection method developed by
Hidalgo et al. (2007).
Given S, the number of sectors, and M, the number of university majors, I define
the (S ×M) matrix Msm whose elements are equal to 1 if sector s uses more than one
worker1 with the major m and 0 otherwise. I define the ubiquity index for each major
m as km,0 =
∑
sMsm which represents the number of sectors in which the major m is
used, notice that in the paper I will both use the term ubiquity and specialzation where
the latter is the inverse of the former (more ubiquitous workers are also less specialzied
since they can be used in a lot of sectors). At the same time I compute ks,0 =
∑
mMsm
which is a complexity index for the sector s and it represents how many different types of
majors are used in the sector s. Moreover, from those two indexes I compute the iterative
indexes (km,1, km,2, km,3, ...) and (ks,1, ks,2, ks,3, ...) according to the following formulation.
km,N =
1
km,0
∑
s
Msmks,N−1
ks,N =
1
ks,0
∑
m
Msmkm,N−1
(1.1)
Therefore each sector s is identified by a vector ks = (ks,0, ks,1, ks,2, ks,3, ...) and each ma-
jor m is described by the vector km = (km,0, km,1, km,2, km,3, ...). For the sectors’ indexes
it is easy to show that the even indicators (ks,0, ks,2, ks,4...) identify the complexity of the
sector s, while the odd ones (ks,1, ks,3, ks,5...) represent the ubiquity of the majors used
in that sector. The opposite is true for the major indexes, in fact, the even indicators
show the ubiquity of that major while the odd ones indicate the complexity of the sectors
in which that major is used. I compute the ks,i indexes with i = 0, ..., 20 for all the 166
NAICS-four digits sectors and the km,i indexes with i = 0, ..., 20 for the 173 majors.
While it is clear to show that ks,1 is the average ubiquity of the majors used in sector s, I
retain useful to explain why ks,2 is the average complexity of the sectors which are similar
to sector s.
Since ks,2 is computed using the km,1 indexes (from equation (1.1)), it has at the numer-
1notice that the results hold also when considering at least one worker, but I retain more accurate to
exclude from the matrix the majors which are used only once in a sector, thus I exclude majors which
are connected to the sector only by chance.
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ator the sum of the km,1 indexes i.e. the sum of the average complexity of the sectors
which use major m, but notice that the sum is for all the m which are used in the sector
considered. This implies that, for the generic sector s, it will be the sum of the average
complexity of only those sectors which uses the majors used in the sector s, in this sense
I compute the average complexity of sectors which are similar to s, similar because they
share the usage of those majors. The same reasoning works for km,2 index but for the
ubiquity instead of complexity.
The iterative nature of the indexes’ formation requires a particular focus on the meaning
of each of them, in particular, in the table 1.1, I list some of the indexes with their de-
scriptions both for the sectors and for the majors.
Table 1.1
Index Meaning
ks,0 Number of different types of majors the s sector uses (complexity of sector s)
km,0 Number of Sectors in which the major m is used (ubiquity of major m)
ks,1 Average ubiquity of the majors used in sector s
km,1 Average complexity of the sectors which use major m
ks,2 Average complexity of the sectors which are similar to sector s
km,2 Average ubiquity of majors which are similar to major m
It is fundamental to understand the reasoning behind the usage of the iterated indexes.
More specifically, using both the information on ubiquity and complexity when computing
the indexes, I am able to classify properly the role of both each worker and each sector
in the society. In order to understand this concept, the next paragraph aims to be an
explicative example of how the index works and why it is needed in the analysis.
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1.2.1 How the indexes work: An explicative example
Consider an economy made by 3 sectors (Superconductor, Motor Vehicle and Textile sec-
tor) and 3 university majors (Physics, Engineering and Management) connected together
according to the matrix described in figure 1.1. From the Matrix it is possible to identify
the connections between sectors and workers, more specifically it tells that workers with
a major in Physics are hired in the Superconductor sector, while the Engineers are hired
both in the Superconductor and the Motor Vehicle sector and finally the workers with a
major in Management are hired both in the Motor Vehicle and in the Textile sector. Since
I know in which sector each worker is used, I can classify the workers not only according to
the number of sectors which need them, but also to the type of sectors in which they could
be hired. From the point of view of the sector, it is optimal to build an index which is
able to distinguish sectors according to the number of skills they use and their types. It is
important, in order to have a complete understanding of the effects of a phenomenon such
as the Globalization on the workers, to be able to use as much information as possible,
with the aim to distinguish the role of each worker and each sector in the society.
The first step to do is to count, for each sector, the number of majors which are used
and, for each major, the number of sectors which use that major. This correspond to
the zero iteration of the index used in this paper. More specifically, it is easy to observe,
from fig.1.1, that both the Superconductor and the Motor Vehicle sector use 2 different
majors, instead, the Textile sector uses only 1 major. Hence the value of ks,0 for each of
the sector will be, respectively, 2, 2 and 1. I apply the same logic for the majors, hence
I count the number of sectors which use each specific major. It follows that the value of
km,0 will be 1,2 and 2 respectively for Physics, Engineering and Management.
The indexes constructed in such a way (at the zero iteration) identify the number of skills
used in each sector and the numer of sectors in which each worker can be used. It is
now important to notice that ks,0 is not able to distinguish between Superconductor and
Motor Vehicle sectors and contemporaneously, km,0 is not able to distinguish between
Engineering and Management, nevertheless we all know that they are different. Hence, I
would like to build an index which goes further and is able to distinguish different sectors
and different majors using all the information available. For this purpose, I build the ks,1
and km,1 indexes which are, respectively, the average km,0 of the majors used in sector
s and the average ks,0 of the sectors which use major m, i.e. respectively, the average
ubiquity at the zero iteration of the majors used in sector s and the average complexity,
at the zero iteration, of the sectors using major m . More specifically, kSuperconductor,1
is the average of kPhysics,0 and kEngineering,0, hence 1.5; instead kMotorV ehicle,1 is the aver-
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age of kEngineering,0 and kManagement,0, hence it is equal to 2; finally kTextile,1 is equal to
kManagement,0. The same reasoning is applied to construct the km,1 indexes for the majors.
In particular kManagement,1 is the average of kMotorV ehicle,0 and kTextile,0, kEngineering,1 is the
average of kSuperconductor,0 and kMotorV ehicle,0 , while kPhysics,1 is equal to kSuperconductor,0.
From this first iteration, it is easy to notice that the index is still not able to distinguish
all the sectors and all the majors since Motor Vehicle and Textile have the same value
and also Physics and Engineering appears to have the same value. For this purpose, it is
necessary to go further and to build the second iteration of this index, i.e. to compute
ks,2 and km,2 respectively for each sector and each major.
Applying the same algorithm of before, I compute, for each sector s, ks,2 as is the average
km,1 of the majors used in that sector, and, for each major m, km,2 as the average ks,1
of the sectors which use that particular major. More specifically, kSuperconductor,2 is the
average of kPhysics,1 and kEngineering,1, while kMotorV ehicle,2 is the average of kEngineering,1
and kManagement,1 and finally kTextile,2 is equal to kManagement,1. Again, applying the same
logic for the majors, I find that kPhysics,2 is equal to kSuperconductor,1, kEngineering,2 is equal
to the average of kSuperconductor,1 and kMotorV ehicle,1, while kManagement,2 is the average of
kMotorV ehicle,1 and kTextile,1.
The (second iterated) indexes built in such a way, are able to classify each sector and each
major distinguishing each one of them. More specifically, they are able to understand that
Textile is the least complex sector, Motor Vehicle is the second most complex and that
the Superconductor sector is the most complex one. In fact, looking at the matrix, it
can be noticed that, even though both Superconductor and Motor Vehicle use the same
number of workers, the type of those workers is different. Motor Vehicle sector uses Man-
agement, while Superconductor uses Physics, the two majors are different because they
are differently specialized, hence provide different skills, and are used differently in the
economy.
The same reasoning works for the majors. More specifically, km,2 is able to distinguish be-
tween Physics, Engineering and Management. Physics appears to be the most specialized
major (the least ubiquitous one) while Management is the least specialized one. Again,
if I wanted to use the 0 iteration, the index km,0 would have not been able to distinguish
between Management and Engineering since they are both used in two sectors, but I know
that, being hired in Textile is different than being hired in the Motor Vehicle sector.
Hence, both ks,2 and km,2 are the best indexes that I can use to distinguish each sector’s
and each major’s characteristics and role into the economy.
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1.2.2 Indexes Correlations and Null Models
Now I focus on the relationship between ks,1 and ks,0 in fig.1.2.
Figure 1.2: 2012 ks,1-ks,0
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From the fig. 1.2 it is possible to observe the negative correlation between the num-
ber of different majors used in a sector and the average ubiquity of that majors. The
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relationship is negative, thus implying that considering two sectors, if one becomes more
complex increasing the number of majors it uses, it will not add a high ubiquitous major
but it will add a low ubiquitous one. This relationship is not obtained by construction
because, even if it is correct to say that, from equation 1.1, ks,1 tends to decrease when
ks,0 increases, an increase in the number of majors used will also increase the numerator
in that equation, which of course will increase ks,1. Hence the overall effect of an increase
in the number of majors in one sector on ks,1 will depend on how much ubiquitous are the
majors which are added. Finding a negative correlation, I observe that in more complex
sectors we will observe more and more specialized workers. Moreover, I prove that this
relationship is not driven by how I construct the index in the following paragraph.
Following Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), I test the relationship in figure 1.2. In order
to test wether the relationship between the complexity of a sector and the average ubiquity
of the majors used in that sector delivers some information, it must be verified wether
this information has been driven only by the way in which I construct the index. More
specifically, if random assigments between majors and sector deliver the same results as
the ones I found, then, the construction of the index is by construction delivering the
results hence the negative relationship of the two will not provide any information.
The first null model I construct consists in a matrix with the same number of sectors and
majors and with the same number of ties between them (of 1s). In figure 1.3 I report
the relationship between complexity and average ubiquity in the null model 12. It is clear
that there is no correlation between the two, thus implying that the negative relationship
found in the data delivers some information about the connections between majors and
sectors in real life.
Figure 1.3: ks,1-ks,0 Null Model 1
2for simplicity just in 2013, but the same of course is true for the other years
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I go further constructing other null models, more similar to the data but with randomly
assigned connections between sectors and majors. I construct a second null model where
the number of sectors and majors are as the original, the number of the ties is the same but
randomly assigned, and at the same time the degree sequence of the sectors is fixed. The
degree sequence is the sequence of the vertex degrees, where the vertices in this second
null model are the sectors and the degree is the number of links each sector has with a
different major. Moreover I construct the third null model with the same number of nodes
and edges as the original but with the same degree sequence for the major nodes3.
I report the Null models and the Original data in the figure 1.4 . It is clearly shown that
the negative relationship observed in the data is not driven by the construction of the
indexes and cannot be due to randomness. Hence it is able to deliver more information
about the inner relationship between majors and sectors.
I retain useful, in order to understand if the index of complexity is reasonably proxying
Figure 1.4: ks,1-ks,0
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the knowledge complexity of a sector, to observe which are, according to the indexes, the
most “knowledge complex” sectors and which are the most specialized workers 4. In table
1.2 the first in the ranking is the most complex sector and the last is the least complex
3From the original Network (Matrix) of Majors and Sectors, I create a random network with the same
number of nodes and edges between nodes (Null 1). Then I construct a network where, in addition to
that, the distribution of the edges to each sector node is the same (Null 2). Moreover I construct a further
random network with the same number of nodes and edges as the original but with the same distribution
of the degrees possessed by each major node (Null 3)
4for the ranking I use the ks,2 and km,2 indexes
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sector. In table 1.3 the first in the ranking is the most specialized major (least ubiquitus
one) and the last is the least specialized one.
Table 1.2: Complexity ranking
Ranking NAICS 4digit Description
1 6113 Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools
2 6111 Secondary Schools
3 5416 Scientific and Technical Consulting services
4 5415 Computer Systems Design and Related Services
5 5417 Scientific Research and Development Services
...
...
...
162 3271 Clay Product and Refractory Manufacturing
163 3131 Fiber, Yarn, and Thread Mills
164 3151 Apparel Knitting Mills
165 3169 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
166 3159 Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel Manufacturing
Table 1.3: Specialization ranking
Ranking University Major
1 Astronomy and Astrophysics
2 Military Technologies
3 Actuarial Science
4 Genetics
...
...
170 Marketing and Marketing Research
171 Accounting
172 General Business
173 Business Management and Administration
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Figure 1.5: ks,2 and km,2 over time
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It is interesting to observe wether the indexes are changing over time or are robust.
From fig.1.5 it is clear to show that both the complexity index and the ubiquity index
are robust over time. This is a good property of the indexes because I would like the
indexes to identify some inner characteristics of both the complexity of the sectors and
the ubiquity of the majors which, by definition, do not change so much over time.
Moreover I study the relationship between the size of a sector (i.e. the number of work-
ers working in that sector) and its complexity and the relationship between the size of a
major (i.e. the number of workers with that major) and its ubiquity. Hence I compute the
correlation between the “size” of a sector and the complexity of that sector and between
the “size” of a major and its ubiquity. In order to do so I count the number of workers
in each sector, for each of this sector I confront this number with the complexity of that
sector. Doing so I find that the Corr(size, ks2) ∈ [0.4502, 0.4645] 5. Hence it is possible
to asses that since the correlation between the two variables is not too strong, the two
measures are not exchangable with each other, thus implying that my index is able to
deliver some information which are not obtained using just size.
Furthermore I study the correlation between the number of workers with a specific major
and the ubiquity of that majors and I find that the Corr(size, km2) ∈ [0.6635, 0.6801]
6. Again the correlation between those two measures, albeit bigger than before, is till
not enough to assess that the index could be substituted by just the size, thus, using my
ubiquity index, I am able to grasp more information than just size.
5it is 0.4556 in 2009, 0.4502 in 2010, 0.4515 in 2011, 0.4645 in 2012 and 0.4577 in 2013
6it is 0.6635 in 2009, 0.6667 in 2010, 0.6732 in 2011, 0.6731 in 2012 and 0.6801 in 2013
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1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Wages Complexity and Ubiquity
Before focusing on the role of complexity and ubiquity on the effects of Globalization on
the high skilled workers’ wages, it is useful to study which is the connection between the
wage of a worker, the complexity of the sector in which she is hired and the ubiquity of
the major she possesses. Hence, in this section, I propose the complexity and the ubiquity
as further and relevant determinants of wages.
I combine the cross sections datasets on wages for the years from 2009 to 2013. I adjust
the wages each year with the inflation rate with respect to 2013. Thus I obtain a repeated
cross section dataset. Since I am combining the indexes of ubiquity and complexity across
the years, in order to avoid changes in the index only due to changes in the number of
available majors or sectors (even though the number does not actually differs almost at
all) I use the standardize version of the indexes7.
Complexity and ubiquity could matter through several channels on the determination
of wages. If we consider the wage determination as the outcome, among others, of wage
negotiation between the workers and the firms, higher ubiquity could give to the worker
a higher bargaining power since she could decide to work elsewhere if the wage is too low.
At the same time, being more specialized, could give to the worker higher negotiation
power since she possesses the specific knowledge which is possessed only by few other
workers. Hence, ex ante, it is not clear the overall direction of the effect of ubiquity on
wages.
The general identification strategy for the wage of worker i, working in sector s having
the major m at time t is the one reported in equation (1.2).
ln(wismt) = β0 + βX + γ1Complexs,t + γ2Ubiquitym,t + γ3Complexs,t ∗Ubiquitym,t + ismt
(1.2)
In table 1.4 I report the regressions results. In particular I control for a series of ob-
servable workers characterstics such as age sex race state languages spoken etc8 moreover
I study also the non linear effect of complexity and ubiquity using an interaction term
of the two. In addition to the control variables and to the year fixed effects, I repeat
7the value of the index divided by its standard deviation
8The control variables are: age, sex, state, citizien status, class of worker, ability to speak english,
marital status, educational attainment, hours worked per week, week worked during the past year and
black dummy
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the regression, as robustness checks, using clustered standards error at the naics 4- digits
level, I also use sector fixed effects at 4 digits level and major fixed effects.
Table 1.4: Complexity, Ubiquity and wage
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
Complexity 0.03308*** 0.13574*** 0.10566*** 0.10566**
(0.00073) (0.00665) (0.00813) (0.04665)
Ubiquity 0.01183*** 0.12130*** 0.07788*** 0.07788**
(0.00061) (0.00707) (0.00868) (0.03553)
Complexity*Ubiquity -0.00645*** -0.00364*** -0.00364**
(0.00041) (0.00041) (0.00179)
Year FE X X X X
Sector FE 4d X X
Major FE X X
Cluster 4d X
Observations 1,542,989 1,542,989 1,542,989 1,542,989
R-squared 0.57986 0.57993 0.61702 0.61702
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with
major m working in sector s at time t, the wages are adjusted to the inflation having 2013
as reference year. Complexity represents the ks,t,2 index for sector s at time t standardized
over the period t. Ubiquity represents the km,t,2 index for major m at time t standardized
over the period t. Robust standard errors clustered at sector (four digits) level are reported
in parentheses in the last column. The control variables used in the specifications are age,
sex, educational attainment, state, citizenship status, class of worker, marital status, hours
worker per week, weeks worked during the year, black dummy, language other than english
spoken, nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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From table 1.4, when allowing for all possible fixed effects and for clustered standard
errors, we observe that an increase in one standard deviation of the index ks,2 induces an
increase of 4.8% of the wage, at the same time, an increase of one standard deviation in
km,2 produces a rise of 1.6% of the wages. When considering the interaction of complexity
and ubiquity, I find that the increase in wage due to an increase in ubiquity is decreasing
with respect to the complexity, i.e. when a worker works in a very complex sector, it is
less important to have a high ubiquitous major.
This result would suggest that, the increase of bargaining power due to high ubiquity
has a stronger effect than the increase in bargaining power due to high specialization,
but, at the same time, when considering highly complex sector, this ubiquity premium
is not so strong. One possible explaination for that, is that in more complex sectors
the importance of the lower level of specialized workers (the highly ubiquitous ones) is
low because their knowledge is not so important when compared with all the knowledges
required in that particular sector.
1.3.2 Complexity, Ubiquity and Globalization
In the next section I study if and how, the complexity of the sectors and the ubiquity of
the majors have a role in the effect of globalization on domestic workers’ wages. More
specifically I combine the dataset from the american economic survey with the trade data
from the US Census Bureau Database - Foreign Trade Division from which I use the value
of Exports from US to the rest of the world and the value of Imports from the rest of the
world.
When I introduce data on trade, the only sectors which remain are mainly the manufac-
turing sectors, hence, it is useful to report the new ranking for the most complex sectors
and the most specialized majors when I introduce the trade data. In table 1.5 I report
the most complex sectors and the most specialized ones9
This section is organized as follow: I will first study the effect of Exports on the wages
of the least specialized and most specialized workers considering only the most complex
and least complex sectors, then I go from this dichotomous vision, to the analysis of the
effects of export intensity on all workers considering their level of ubiquity and the com-
plexity of their sector. After that I will introduce also Imports into the analysis.
9In the sectors’ table the first sector is the most complex and the last sector is the least complex. In
the majors’ table the first major is the most specialized and the last is the least specialized. In the tables
the ks2 and km2 reported are standardized for each year.
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Table 1.5: Complex-Ubiquity Ranking
naics4 Sector Description ks2st
3254 Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing 19.043726
3391 Medical Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing 19.017021
3344 Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing 18.827576
3364 Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing 18.816758
3259 Other Chemical Product and Preparation Manufacturing 18.526658
3321 Forging and Stamping 11.830463
3169 Other Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 11.75657
3131 Fiber, Yarn, and Thread Mills 11.737089
3122 Tobacco Manufacturing 11.681647
3159 Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel Manufacturing 11.643073
Major Major Description km2st
2411 Geological and Geophysical Engineering 11.055806
3801 Military Technologies 11.314193
5001 Astronomy and Astrophysics 11.35235
6202 Actuarial Science 11.418827
3201 Court Reporting 11.595324
5200 Psychology 18.949993
6206 Marketing and Marketing Research 18.992877
6201 Accounting 19.203665
6200 General Business 19.221224
6203 Business Management and Administration 19.255351
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Exports on Most Specialized and Least Specialized workers
This section focuses on the effects of exports on the most specialized and the least spe-
cialized workers if the sector in which they work is the most or the least complex one.
It is important to identify, in the regression, which are the most specialized and least
specialized workers, in order to do so I take into consideration, for each naics 3 digits
sector, the distribution of ubiquity of the workers working in that sector and I compare
the ubiquity of each worker with this distribution. Hence I define the most and the least
specialized workers. I follow the same method for sector complexity, thus, I compare the
ks,2 of each sector with the distribution of ks,2 in its macrosector in the year considered.
Therefore, I am able to identify which are the most complex sectors and the least complex
ones.
Following this method, I define the dummy umtq1 which is 1 if the worker’s major, m,
has an ubiquity measure in the first quartile of the distribution of the ubiquity in that
year in the (3 digits) sector in which the worker works. I also define umtq4 equal to one
if the ubiquity of the worker’s major is in the fourth quartile of the ubiquity distribution
in the worker’s sector. Therefore if umtq1 = 1 we are considering the most specialized
workers while if umtq4 = 1 the least specialized ones.
Moreover I define the dummy lcst = 1 if the sector complexity is below the median of
complexity’s distribution for the macro sector (3 digits) and 0 otherwise, hence lcst = 1
implies least complex sectors and lcst = 0 implies most complex ones.
Therefore I study the effect of Exports in the most complex sector and in the least com-
plex sector for the most specialized and the least specialized workers:
ln(wismt,e) = Xβ + γ1ln(expst) + γ2lcst + γ3ln(expst) ∗ lcst + fs + ft + ist (1.3)
Where X are all the control variables for the observable workers characteristics, ln(expst)
is the logarithm of the exports of sector s at time t from US to the rest of the world, fs
is the sector fixed effect at the 3-digits level, and ft is the time fixed effect.
Table 1.6 shows that an increase of exports in the most complex sectors is associated
with an increase in wages, this increase is stronger for the most specialized workers.
Moreover the results suggest that when the increase of exports happens in the least
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Table 1.6: Effects of Globalization on wages
um,q1 = 1 um,q4 = 1
(Highest Specialization) (Lowest Specialization)
VARIABLES Wage Wage
Exports 0.06311** 0.03633**
(0.02477) (0.01763)
lcst 1.34179** 0.81748**
(0.56036) (0.40300)
Exports ∗ lcst -0.05940** -0.03662**
(0.02371) (0.01717)
Constant 8.42684*** 8.74469***
(0.51134) (0.37641)
Year FE X X
Sector FE 3d X X
Observations 43,319 52,546
R-squared 0.53038 0.45423
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with
major m working in sector s at time t, the wages are adjusted to the inflation having 2013
as reference year. The variable Exports represents the natural logarithm of the exports of
sector s at time t. The dummy lcst = 1 if the s sector (4 digits) is among the least complex
sectors in the macro aggregate of sector identified with 3 digits, lcst = 0 implies that s is
among the most complex ones. The dummy umtq1 = 1 if the major of the worker i is among
the most specialized majors used in the sector in which the worker is hired, umtq4 = 1 if the
major is among the least specialized ones. Robust standard errors clustered at sector (four
digits) level are reported in parentheses. The control variables used in the specifications are
age, sex, educational attainment, state, citizenship status, class of worker, marital status,
hours worker per week, weeks worked during the year, black dummy, language other than
english spoken, nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
complex sector instead, the effect is different, more specifically it has a negative effect on
wages if we compare it with the most complex sector’s Export scenario, and it has an
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overall positive effect10 for the most specialized workers and it has an overall negative11
effect for the least specialized ones. In contrast, a high complex globalization induces12
an increase in wages of both the most specialized worker and the least specialized ones13.
Summarizing these first results, increases of Exports have a greater positve effect if
they happen to be in the most complex sectors, the most specialized workers are the ones
who benefit the most from the increase in exports. Exports in the least complex sectors
are instead associated with a deterioration of the least specialized workers’ conditions
and a small increase of the wages of the most specialized workers’ wage. All the type of
workers are better off if the increase of exports happens in the most complex sector than
in the least complex one.
Complexity, Ubiquity and Export Intensity
After having studied the effect of the value of exports on wages, I must make a step
forward in the direction of identifying the effect of exports and imports on wages after
considering the complex-ubiquity effects. One possible problem I must avoid is to include
the effect of the sectors’ total output in the coefficient of exports and imports. In par-
ticular, instead of observing the effect of exports, I could have just observed the effect
of the size of the sectors in which workers work14. In order to avoid this issue, I use
the data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). From this dataset I take the
information of the total output of each sector (which has been identified by the literature
using the total value of shipments) for the years from 2008 to 2011. I use the economic
census (EC)15 for 2012. More precisely, using the ASM and the EC data, I construct
a database having the information on total output (Ost) for each sector defined at four
digit level from 2008 to 2012. I then combine this dataset with the dataset which has
information on workers characteristics, sectors’ complexity, majors’ ubiquity, exports and
imports by sector. Hence I construct the variables of export intensity (Est
Ost
) and import
intensity ( Ist
Ost
) for each sector s at time t.
I study the effect of export intensity in one sector on the wages of workers in that sec-
100.06311-0.05940=0.00371
110.03633-0.03662=-0.00029
12I cannot prove causality at this stage, I am instead suggesting a strong correlation
13respectively of 0.06311 and 0.03633
14This problem is partially solved introducing sector fixed effect, but this solution does not take into
account changes in total output over time for different sectors, hence it is better to introduce the share
of exports (or imports) over the total output.
15The economic census substitutes the ASM every 5 years (for the years ending with 2 and 7).
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tor, taking into consideration how the effect of exports can influence in different ways
workers with different level of specialization and workers working in sector with different
complexity. I control for workers characteristics, and for time, sector and majors fixed
effects.
ln(wismt) = Xβ+γ1ks2,t + γ2km2,t + γ3ks2,tkm2,t+
+ γ4ln(
Est−1
Ost−1
) + γ5ln(
Est−1
Ost−1
)ks2,t + γ6ln(
Est−1
Ost−1
)km2,t + fs + fm + ft + ist
(1.4)
Table 1.7 reports the results of regression (1.4).
Notice that the interaction of export both with complexity and ubiquity is significant
and it is positive for the former and negative for the latter. Thus implying that, an
increase in export in more complex sectors is associated with an increase of wages, this
increase is bigger the more the worker is specialized16.
The average effect of an increase of 1% of exports intensity implies an increase of
0.063% of wage. If we consider the most complex sector (Pharmaceutical and Medicine
Manufacturing) and the Least complex one (Apparel Accessories), the average effect of a
1% increase of export intensity in the former induces an increase of 0.11% of wage while
the same increase in the latter implies a decrease of 0.0035% of wage.
From the point of view of the workers, being among the most specialized workers (geo-
physical engineers), the effect of an increase of 1% of exports intensity is an increase of
0.15% of wage, instead being among the least specialized workers (with a degree in busi-
ness management and adminitration) the same increase in exports implies an Increase of
0.035% of wage. Moreover being the least specialized worker in the least complex sector
implies a negative effect of export (-0.033%) while the most specialized workers in the
least complex sector have a positve effect from the increase in export (+0.083%). Finally,
increases of exports in the most complex sector induce a rise of wage for both the most
specialized and the least specialized workers with greater effect for the former (+0.2% for
the most specialized against a +0.077% for the least specialized).
16Not using an instrumental variable approach we cannot be completely sure of the presence of a
causality linkage but, throughout the chapter, I will prove that the correlation is strong, persistence and
does not present relevant endogeneity problems.
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Table 1.7: ComplexUbiquity Exports Intensity and wage
VARIABLES Wage
Complexity -0.04699
(0.04858)
Ubiquity 0.08985***
(0.03170)
Exports 0.06801
(0.04507)
Exports*Complexity 0.01475*
(0.00762)
Exports*Ubiquity -0.01414***
(0.00523)
Sector 3d FE X
Year FE X
Major FE X
Observations 171,110
R2 0.51510
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of an-
nual wage of worker i with major m working in sector s at time t,
the wages are adjusted to the inflation having 2013 as reference
year. Complexity represents the ks,t,2 index for sector s at time
t standardized over the period t. Ubiquity represents the km,t,2
index for major m at time t standardized over the period t. The
variable Exports represents the natural logarithm of the exports
share of sector s at t− 1. The export share is computed dividing
the export value with the total value of shipment of the sector
considered. Robust standard errors clustered at sector (four dig-
its) level are reported in parentheses. The control variables used
in the specifications are age, sex, educational attainment, state,
citizenship status, class of worker, marital status, hours worker
per week, weeks worked during the year, black dummy, language
other than english spoken, nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Complexity, Ubiquity, Export and Import Intensity
Now I introduce in the analysis also the import intensity in order to study the broader
effect of Complex-Ubiquity on Globalization’s effects, both in terms of Exports and Im-
ports. Thus, I estimate the following regression.
ln(wismt) = Xβ+γ1ks2,t + γ2km2,t + γ3ks2,tkm2,t+
+ γ4ln(
Est−1
Ost−1
) + γ5ln(
Est−1
Ost−1
)ks2,t + γ6ln(
Est−1
Ost−1
)km2,t+
+ γ6ln(
Ist−1
Ost−1
) + γ8ln(
Ist−1
Ost−1
)ks2,t + γ9ln(
Ist−1
Ost−1
)km2,t + fs + fm + ft + ist
(1.5)
The results of the regression (1.5) are reported in the first column of the table 1.8.
The second and the third column are instead reporting, as robustness checks, the results
when controlling for sectors’ trend (using sector time fixed effects) finding that, also in
these case, the results hold.
The results in table 1.8 show that, when considering the exports, not only the previous
findings are confirmed, but also, when including imports, the results are even bigger and
more significant. This is due to the fact that the effect of imports on wages goes in the
opposite direction of exports, thus, without controlling for imports I were underestimating
the exports’ results.
More specifically an increase of 1% of export intensity is associated, on average with
an increase of wages of 0.081%, while the same increase of import induces to a decrease
of 0.025%.
In the most complex sector, an increase of 1% of export intensity produces an average
increase of 0.16% of wage, while an increase of Import of the same amount in the same
sector implies a decrease of 0.032% of wage.
If we consider instead the least complex sector, an increase of export induces, on average,
to a decrease of wage of 0.044% while a rise in imports implies an increase of wage equal
to 0.047%.
From the point of view of the workers, the least specialized workers experience, on aver-
age, an increase of wages equal to 0.032% due to export and a decrease of 0.0007% due to
imports. Instead the most specialized workers observe a rise of their wage of 0.23% due
to an increase in export and a decrease of 0.1% due to imports.
Moreover being the least specialized worker in the least complex sector implies a nega-
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Table 1.8: ComplexUbiquity Export and Import Intensity
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
Complexity -0.02911 -0.02794 -0.02614 -0.06059***
(0.04757) (0.07031) (0.05262) (0.01746)
Ubiquity 0.07476** 0.06426** 0.06815** 0.05684***
(0.03100) (0.02519) (0.03007) (0.01913)
Exports 0.04487 -0.04397 0.02714 0.06832
(0.07945) (0.14862) (0.09555) (0.04819)
Exports*Complexity 0.02762*** 0.02856*** 0.02672*** 0.01186***
(0.00628) (0.00988) (0.00742) (0.00318)
Exports*Ubiquity -0.02387*** -0.01950*** -0.02198*** -0.01505***
(0.00422) (0.00397) (0.00385) (0.00385)
Imports 0.02761 0.06726 0.02760 -0.01008
(0.06111) (0.10869) (0.06060) (0.04604)
Imports*Complexity -0.01613** -0.01663* -0.01566** -0.00632**
(0.00668) (0.00910) (0.00647) (0.00299)
Imports*Ubiquity 0.01207** 0.01022** 0.01162** 0.00640*
(0.00454) (0.00428) (0.00463) (0.00351)
Sector 3d FE X X
Year FE X X
Major FE X X X X
Year#Sector 3d FE X
Sector 4d FE X
Year#Sector 2d FE X
Observations 171,110 171,110 171,110 171,110
R2 0.51548 0.51601 0.51557 0.52069
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with major
m working in sector s at time t, the wages are adjusted to the inflation having 2013 as reference
year. Complexity represents the ks,t,2 index for sector s at time t standardized over the period t.
Ubiquity represents the km,t,2 index for major m at time t standardized over the period t. The
variable Exports represents the natural logarithm of the exports share of sector s at t − 1. The
export share is computed dividing the export value with the total value of shipment of the sector
considered. The variable Imports represents the natural logarithm of the imports share of sector s
at t− 1. The import share is computed dividing the import value with the total value of shipment
of the sector considered. Robust standard errors clustered at sector (four digits) level are reported
in parentheses. The control variables used in the specifications are age, sex, educational attainment,
state, citizenship status, class of worker, marital status, hours worker per week, weeks worked during
the year, black dummy, language other than english spoken, nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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tive effect of export (-0.093%) and a positive effect of import (+0.072%), while the most
specialized workers in the least complex sector have a positve effect from the increase in
export (+0.1%) and a negative effect from the increase in import (-0.027%).
Finally, increases of exports in the most complex sector induce a rise of wage for both
the most specialized and the least specialized workers with greater effect for the former
(+0.31% for the most specialized against a +0.11% for the least specialized) and increases
of imports induce reductions of wage of both the most and least specialized workers with
greater effect for the most specialized workers (-0.15% for the most specialized against a
-0.047% for the least specialized). The mentioned percentages which represent the effect
of an increase of 1% of exports or imports on wages are summarized graphically in the
figure 1.6
Figure 1.6: Effects of an increase of 1% of export (or import) intensity on wages
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It is then possible to summarize the results obtained in this section in the following
way.
Exports in more complex sectors have higher positive effect on wages of workers and higher
specialization implies higher benefit from exports. Imports in more complex sectors have
higher negative effect on the wages of workers and being more specialized implies bigger
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negative effect from imports. Regarding the Residual wage inequality, working in a more
complex sector increases a worker’s wage while owning a more ubiquitous major increases
one’s wage. This high-ubiquity premium is decreasing with the complexity of the sector
in which the worker works.
In the next section I report relevant robustness checks. The results are robust and
persistent to all of them.
Robustness checks
Time Invariant complexity and ubiquity indexes
As robustness check I compute the complexity and the ubiquity indexes unique for all the
5 years in our data. More specifically, I continue to use the thereshold of two workers as a
lower bound when computing the connections between workers and sectors. The table 1.9
shows that the results on the interacted effect of complexity and ubiquity on exports is
robust to all the specifications both using the full interacted model and the one with only
the interacted terms and both allowing trend (sector-time) fixed effects or sector fixed
effects.
Capital Intensive control
Now I introduce into the analysis the capital investment control at sector level in order
to prove that the indexes are not just proxy for sector capital intensity. More specifically
I interact the investment in capital by sector with the export share. I use the 2009 data
on capital investment from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database which is
commonly used in the literature to identify capital intensity for each sector. I use the latest
information for each sector (2009) and I argue that, since we are interested in controlling
for the inner characteristic of a sector usage of capital we should not be concerned too
much about the time invariancy of this variable.
From the table 1.10 I show that the results are still robust to this further control, both
using 3 digits and 4 digits sector fixed effects.
Moreover, also when considering a time invariant index of complexity and ubiquity,
controlling for capital intensity does not change the robustness of my results (see table
1.11).
Furthermore, in order to exclude that my results are capturing some other effects, I
interact both exports and imports with other observable characteristics of the workers
such as age, sex, class of worker and schooling. Hence I find that, both using annual
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Table 1.9: Robustness Check: Time Invariant Indexes
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
Complexity -0.11246 -0.12026
(0.10485) (0.10265)
Ubiquity 0.05634** 0.05694**
(0.02676) (0.02655)
Exports -2.06384*** -2.19045*** -1.34879 -1.41396
(0.76502) (0.78479) (0.86419) (0.89821)
Exports*Complexity 0.06388*** 0.06644*** 0.04752*** 0.04864***
(0.01562) (0.01602) (0.01714) (0.01797)
Exports*Ubiquity -0.01099*** -0.01070*** -0.01106*** -0.01074***
(0.00361) (0.00356) (0.00366) (0.00361)
Imports 1.39934* 1.45015* 1.55421** 1.60417**
(0.80866) (0.83456) (0.74809) (0.78209)
Imports*Complexity -0.03839** -0.03947** -0.04193** -0.04297**
(0.01782) (0.01843) (0.01612) (0.01695)
Imports*Ubiquity 0.00457 0.00451 0.00452 0.00443
(0.00345) (0.00341) (0.00344) (0.00341)
Sector FE (3d) X X
Year FE X X
Major FE X X X X
Year#Sector FE (3d) X X
Observations 170,656 170,656 170,656 170,656
R2 0.51543 0.51602 0.51526 0.51583
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with major m working in sector s at time t, the wages
are adjusted to the inflation having 2013 as reference year. Complexity represents the ks,2 index for sector s standardized over the whole
period of five years. Ubiquity represents the km,2 index for major m standardized over the whole period. The variable Exports represents
the natural logarithm of the exports share of sector s at t− 1. The export share is computed dividing the export value with the total value of
shipment of the sector considered. The variable Imports represents the natural logarithm of the imports share of sector s at t−1. The import
share is computed dividing the import value with the total value of shipment of the sector considered. Robust standard errors clustered at
sector (four digits) level are reported in parentheses. The control variables used in the specifications are age, sex, educational attainment,
state, citizenship status, class of worker, marital status, hours worker per week, weeks worked during the year, black dummy, language other
than english spoken, nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1.10: Robustness Check: Sector’s capital intesity
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
Complexity -0.03581 -0.07376 -0.04017 -0.06084***
(0.04952) (0.06673) (0.05374) (0.01745)
Ubiquity 0.07445** 0.07112*** 0.06880** 0.05599***
(0.02972) (0.02321) (0.02847) (0.01924)
Exports 0.05950 -0.12706 0.01717 0.06612
(0.08730) (0.18238) (0.09755) (0.05077)
Exports * Complexity 0.03442*** 0.05365*** 0.03548*** 0.01139***
(0.00727) (0.01324) (0.00819) (0.00308)
Exports * Ubiquity -0.02713*** -0.02755*** -0.02541*** -0.01465***
(0.00467) (0.00472) (0.00441) (0.00389)
Imports 0.02947 0.07867 0.03317 -0.03710
(0.06511) (0.13690) (0.06392) (0.04355)
Imports * Complexity -0.02325*** -0.03439*** -0.02325*** -0.00584**
(0.00703) (0.01139) (0.00686) (0.00279)
Imports * Ubiquity 0.01519*** 0.01706*** 0.01481*** 0.00631*
(0.00429) (0.00443) (0.00435) (0.00351)
Exports * Capital Intensity -0.00002 -0.00007*** -0.00003 0.00000
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00000)
Imports * Capital Intensity 0.00002 0.00006*** 0.00003 0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00001)
Sector 3d FE X X
Year FE X X
Major FE X X X X
Year#Sector 3d FE X
Sector 4d FE X
Year#Sector 2d X X
Observations 170,835 170,835 170,835 170,835
R2 0.51585 0.51676 0.51594 0.52078
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with major m working in sector s at time t, the wages are
adjusted to the inflation having 2013 as reference year. Complexity represents the ks,t,2 index for sector s at time t standardized over the period
t. Ubiquityrepresents the km,t,2 index for major m at time t standardized over the period t. The variable Exports represents the natural logarithm
of the exports share of sector s at t − 1. The export share is computed dividing the export value with the total value of shipment of the sector
considered. The variable Imports represents the natural logarithm of the imports share of sector s at t − 1. The import share is computed dividing
the import value with the total value of shipment of the sector considered. Robust standard errors clustered at sector (four digits) level are reported
in parentheses. Capital Intensity represent the total capital expenditure for the sector s in 2009. The control variables used in the specifications are
age, sex, educational attainment, state, citizenship status, class of worker, marital status, hours worker per week, weeks worked during the year, black
dummy, language other than english spoken, nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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indexes for complexity and ubiquity or one index for all the years, my results are robust
and even bigger when controlling for those interactions.
Worker’s Occupation
I go further with the robustness checks introducing the occupation type into the analysis.
More specifically, in order to be sure that the results on ubiquity are not identifying other
effects, I introduce as control the type of occupation of the worker. In particular I use the
SOC occupation code in order to control for the effect of the type of occupation of the
worker (manager, engineers, technicians, etc.). I both control using the SOC index alone
and interacting it with Exports and Imports. I find that my results are still robust when
controlling for the occupation type thus implying that my results are able to identify an
effect which is different from the simple type of occupation often taken into consideration
in the literature. In the table 1.12 I report the regression results17.
Separating the effect of Export from the effect of output
As further robustness check, I distinguish now the role of export from the role of output.
More specifically, in order to be sure that the coefficient of Export Share is not driven by
the changes in the output level, I use the Export variable instead of export share, and I
control for the sector output. In table 1.13 I report the results. The results on Exports
are still significant for this further robustness check.
17For simplicity I report only the regression table where the indexes of ubiquity and complexity are
determined yearly. Moreover this table does not consider also the interaction term of Exports with the
type of workers, but my results are robust also when allowing the interaction terms of exports and SOC
and when considering those interaction in the specification with time invariant indexes.
1.3. Empirical Analysis 41
Table 1.11: Robustness Check: Sector’s capital intesity
VARIABLES Wage Wage
Complexity -0.15703* -0.24664***
(0.09329) (0.06281)
Ubiquity 0.05250** 0.04824*
(0.02614) (0.02557)
Exports -3.64517*** -7.15608***
(1.09024) (1.10710)
Exports*Complexity 0.10186*** 0.18677***
(0.02591) (0.02620)
Exports*Ubiquity -0.01070*** -0.00991***
(0.00353) (0.00346)
Imports 2.74237** 5.49440***
(1.04229) (1.12876)
Imports*Complexity -0.07119*** -0.13874***
(0.02411) (0.02720)
Imports*Ubiquity 0.00472 0.00452
(0.00341) (0.00336)
Exports * Capital Intensity -0.00004 -0.00015***
(0.00003) (0.00003)
Imports * Capital Intensity 0.00004 0.00015***
(0.00003) (0.00003)
Sector 3d FE X
Year FE X
Major FE X X
Year#Sector 3d FE X
Observations 170,381 170,381
R2 0.51635 0.51849
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with major m working in sector s at
time t, the wages are adjusted to the inflation having 2013 as reference year. Complexity represents the ks,2 index for
sector s standardized over the whole period of five years. Ubiquity represents the km,2 index for major m standardized
over the whole period. The variable Exports represents the natural logarithm of the exports share of sector s at t − 1.
The export share is computed dividing the export value with the total value of shipment of the sector considered. The
variable Imports represents the natural logarithm of the imports share of sector s at t− 1. The import share is computed
dividing the import value with the total value of shipment of the sector considered. Robust standard errors clustered
at sector (four digits) level are reported in parentheses. Capital Intensity represent the total capital expenditure for the
sector s in 2009. The control variables used in the specifications are age, sex, educational attainment, state, citizenship
status, class of worker, marital status, hours worker per week, weeks worked during the year, black dummy, language
other than english spoken, nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1.12: Robustness Check: Worker’s Occupation
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
Complexity 0.00244 0.00912 0.00534 -0.04609***
(0.04108) (0.06265) (0.04627) (0.01475)
Ubiquity 0.04033 0.03423 0.03551 0.03519**
(0.02685) (0.02126) (0.02591) (0.01681)
Exports -0.00422 -0.07100 -0.01548 0.02655
(0.05723) (0.11557) (0.07304) (0.04027)
Exports*Complexity 0.01911*** 0.01940** 0.01831*** 0.00762***
(0.00510) (0.00822) (0.00610) (0.00286)
Exports*Ubiquity -0.01501*** -0.01137*** -0.01359*** -0.00913***
(0.00361) (0.00327) (0.00323) (0.00329)
Imports 0.01592 0.06136 0.01485 -0.02588
(0.04725) (0.08128) (0.04771) (0.04317)
Imports*Complexity -0.01309** -0.01387** -0.01270** -0.00451*
(0.00505) (0.00685) (0.00480) (0.00269)
Imports*Ubiquity 0.01045*** 0.00852** 0.01013** 0.00551*
(0.00382) (0.00353) (0.00382) (0.00328)
Sector 3d FE X X
Year FE X X
Major FE X X X X
Year#Sector 3d FE X
Sector 4d FE X
Year#Sector 2d FE X
Observations 171,110 171,110 171,110 171,110
R-squared 0.57855 0.57900 0.57862 0.58199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with major m working in sector s at time t, the wages
are adjusted to the inflation having 2013 as reference year. Complexity represents the ks,t,2 index for sector s at time t standardized over
the period t. Ubiquityrepresents the km,t,2 index for major m at time t standardized over the period t. The variable Exports represents
the natural logarithm of the exports share of sector s at t − 1. The export share is computed dividing the export value with the total
value of shipment of the sector considered. The variable Imports represents the natural logarithm of the imports share of sector s at t− 1.
The import share is computed dividing the import value with the total value of shipment of the sector considered. Robust standard errors
clustered at sector (four digits) level are reported in parentheses. The control variables used in the specifications are age, sex, educational
attainment, state, citizenship status, class of worker, marital status, hours worker per week, weeks worked during the year, black dummy,
language other than english spoken, nativity and type of occupation.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1.13: Robustness Check: Exports and Output as separate variables
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
Complexity -0.29782** -0.38483** -0.30144** -0.14466***
(0.12034) (0.16982) (0.13055) (0.04676)
Ubiquity 0.35193*** 0.30054*** 0.33399*** 0.23527***
(0.08043) (0.06896) (0.08144) (0.05377)
Exports 0.02100 -0.12562 0.00661 0.05820
(0.06643) (0.10855) (0.06282) (0.04181)
Exports*Complexity 0.02716*** 0.03272*** 0.02704*** 0.00948***
(0.00580) (0.00694) (0.00581) (0.00275)
Exports*Ubiquity -0.02230*** -0.01881*** -0.02131*** -0.01215***
(0.00369) (0.00410) (0.00391) (0.00287)
Imports 0.06565 0.11568 0.06409 0.03680
(0.06033) (0.10916) (0.05986) (0.04535)
Imports*Complexity -0.01391** -0.01561* -0.01361** -0.00453
(0.00686) (0.00890) (0.00669) (0.00321)
Imports*Ubiquity 0.00806* 0.00682 0.00787 0.00274
(0.00460) (0.00496) (0.00479) (0.00336)
Output -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant 7.34985*** 9.21077*** 7.58208*** 7.85688***
(0.89929) (1.58690) (1.10905) (1.04302)
Major FE X X X X
Sector 3d FE X X
Year FE X X
Year#Sector 3d FE X
Sector 4d FE X
Year#Sector 2d FE X
Observations 171,110 171,110 171,110 171,110
R-squared 0.51577 0.51630 0.51583 0.52077
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with major m working in sector s at time t, the wages
are adjusted to the inflation having 2013 as reference year. Complexity represents the ks,t,2 index for sector s at time t standardized over
the period t. Ubiquity represents the km,t,2 index for major m at time t standardized over the period t. The variable Exports represents
the natural logarithm of the exports of sector s at t− 1. The variable Imports represents the natural logarithm of the imports of sector s at
t− 1. The variable Output represent the total value of shipment of the sector considered at time t− 1. Robust standard errors clustered at
sector (four digits) level are reported in parentheses. The control variables used in the specifications are age, sex, educational attainment,
state, citizenship status, class of worker, marital status, hours worker per week, weeks worked during the year, black dummy, language other
than english spoken and nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Endogeneity checks
Now I will focus on eventual endogeneity issues which could bias my results.
First of all I study the case in which the fact that more complex sectors export more
could bias my results.
Firstly I report the correlation between complexity of a sector and export intensity which
is equal to 0.31. Hence, at a first glance, they do not appear to be as much correlated
to bias the result. Still I must check if, introducing the square of complexity or the
square of Export intensity instead of the intraction of export and complexity, I obtain the
same result. In particular obtaining the same results would mean that, when I use the
interaction term, I just proxy this non linearity. Moreover, when I consider in the same
regression the square term and the interaction term, I must check that the last is still
significant and the former is not.
In table 1.14 I report the regression results. I find that, when introducing the square
terms alone, the results are very different, thus implying that it is not the same to write
k2s2 or (ks2 ∗ Expintensity). Moreover, when I consider both the interaction term and the
square term, the first is significant and the latter becomes insignificant. Thus, I can assess
that my results are not biased by the fact that more complex sectors could export more.
My results could be biased if the wage of worker i in sector s could influence the overall
exports of sector s (Reverse Causality Problem). First of all, it is possible to exclude that
the wage of one worker can actually affect the total exports of the sector in which she
works. Moreover the export intensity measure is lagged, hence this would imply that
a single worker today have to affect the last year exports of the sector in which she is
working.
It can be indeed true that workers in the same sector could have a correlated wage, but,
this problem is solved with the use of clustered standard errors and sector fixed effects.
Moreover, if we want to examine the issue that the sectors with higher wages have lower
(or higher) exports due to some productivity effect, then, this is not a reverse causality
problem but it is an omitted variable one which I discuss in the next paragraph. Hence I
don’t retain the reverse causality issue to matter for my results.
Consider now a variable which is actually affecting both Export and wages (Omitted
Variable Problem), indeed it is very likely that such a variable exists and, even though
I am controlling for major, sector and time fixed effects, there could still be a residual
part which affects still Exports and wages. My analysis is interested into the interaction
between the exports and complexity (and ubiquity). Hence the results would be bias if
this unobservable variable could affect how exports effect differs among more and less
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Table 1.14: ComplexUbiquity Export and Import Intensity
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
Complexity 0.03585 -0.03135 -0.06570 -0.06155
(0.04804) (0.05033) (0.05625) (0.05171)
Ubiquity 0.04157 0.07558** 0.04738 0.07491**
(0.03030) (0.03203) (0.02906) (0.03085)
Exports 0.17047 0.05120 0.25598*** 0.06610
(0.13169) (0.12637) (0.07196) (0.08883)
Exports2 0.00524 -0.00098
(0.01061) (0.01079)
Exports*Complexity 0.02802*** 0.02648***
(0.00687) (0.00680)
Exports*Ubiquity -0.00870*** -0.02404*** -0.01063*** -0.02406***
(0.00240) (0.00463) (0.00338) (0.00417)
Imports -0.08122 0.02789 -0.08816 0.02309
(0.05975) (0.06035) (0.05837) (0.06369)
Imports*Complexity -0.00016 -0.01616** -0.00049 -0.01599**
(0.00732) (0.00666) (0.00694) (0.00664)
Imports*Ubiquity 0.00320 0.01210** 0.00401 0.01221***
(0.00490) (0.00455) (0.00522) (0.00455)
Complexity2 0.00323** 0.00119
(0.00138) (0.00144)
Sector 3d FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Major FE X X X X
Observations 171,110 171,110 171,110 171,110
R2 0.51509 0.51548 0.51514 0.51549
Notes : The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage of worker i with major m working in sector s at time t, the wages
are adjusted to the inflation having 2013 as reference year. Complexity represents the ks,t,2 index for sector s at time t standardized over
the period t. Ubiquityrepresents the km,t,2 index for major m at time t standardized over the period t. The variable Exports represents
the natural logarithm of the exports share of sector s at t − 1. The export share is computed dividing the export value with the total
value of shipment of the sector considered. The variable Imports represents the natural logarithm of the imports share of sector s at t− 1.
The import share is computed dividing the import value with the total value of shipment of the sector considered. Robust standard errors
clustered at sector (four digits) level are reported in parentheses. The control variables used in the specifications are age, sex, educational
attainment, state, citizenship status, class of worker, marital status, hours worker per week, weeks worked during the year, black dummy,
language other than english spoken, nativity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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complex sectors (more or less specialized workers). Hence, for the endogenity issue to
be a problem, it is not enough to consider an effect which affects linearly exports and
wages, but it is instead required it to be affecting the way in which exports effect changes
according to complexity and wages. Such an event indeed could exist but, as far as I
know, it is not clear what it could be. Furthermore it has been recently proved by Bun
and Harrison (2014) that, under reasonable assumptions18 the use of OLS estimation
gives an exogenous and consistent coefficient of the interaction term even when one of the
variable of the interaction is endogenous. The OLS results appear to be as good as the
IV results for the interaction term coefficient. For these reasons, I retain this endogeneity
issue not to be very worriying for my results.
Now I consider a reverse causality problem. In particular it is reasonable to say that,
when wages in one sector are higher, more people would like to be hired in that sector
hence increasing the number of different majors and then complexity of the sector. In order
to understand why this problem is not a serious issue for my project, I must take a step
back and consider how I construct the complexity index. Sectors are more complex not
only if the number of workers with different majors is higher, but also if more specialized
workers work in that sector. Hence, at a first glance, it is not clear that an increase in
the number of workers will actually increase the complexity of the sector, because it will
depend, in the end, on their level of specialization. Moreover we can make a step forward,
in particular, it is reasonable to assume that majors with a high average wage are those
majors that will on average attract more people. This will imply that sectors which on
average pay more, attract more people but at the same time those people would be more
ubiquitous. Hence, there is one force pushing for the increase in complexity, through
an increase in the number of workers, and another force pushing down the complexity
through the increase of the ubiquity of those new workers. Hence the overall results is
not clear, therefore it is possible to say that my results are not strongly biased in one
direction. It is still indeed true that the overall effect could be partially bias the results,
but, due to the mentioned reasons, I retain this effect not to be too much worrying for
the results to hold.
18if x is endogenous and w is not, then the coefficient for x∗w will be exogenous if E(xi) = 0, E(wi) = 0,
E(xi+ui|wi) = E(xiui) where ui is the error term of our regression. Moreover if ui, wi and xi are jointly
normally distributed with mean zero and variance matrix, the OLS coefficient of the interaction term is
consistent
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1.4 Discussion
In this section I explain one possible channel through which complex-ubiquity could affect
the effects of globalization on high skilled workers wage. In doing so I describe the main
elements of my theoretical model, extensively discussed in the next chapter of the thesis,
whose aim is to study how sector complexity and skill ubiquity have a role on the effects
of Globalization on workers’ wage. This section’s aim is to summarize briefly the results
of the theory linking them to the empirical results found in this first chapter.
Consider a monopolistic competition model with two manufacturing sectors19. Each
firm produces one variety of one of the two sectors and uses blue collar workers (low
skilled) and specialized (high skilled) workers in the production.
Sector one is assumed to be less complex than sector two, thus implying that, while sector
one requires, apart from the low skilled workers, just one type of specific knowledge,
sector two will also need a more specific one. More complex sectors are then the ones
which use a higher number of knowledges in their pruduction and at the same time more
specialized knowledges. Those knowledges are represented in the model by the horizontally
heterogenous high skilled workers.
There are two types of high skilled workers, workers with specialization one and work-
ers with specialization two, the former are the ones whose knowledge is more common,
or less specialized, and the latter are the most specialized ones. Hence, workers with
specialization one will be used in both sectors while workers with specialization two will
be used only in the most complex one (sector two).
Workers can move across sectors but only in the position for which they have a spe-
cialization for, thus, the wage of the workers with the same specialization is the same.
Hence, workers of type one will earn w1 and workers of type two will earn w2, both the
two wages are endogenously determined in the model.
The overall demand for the varieties of the two sector is equal to the total earnings of
the workers and the total supply of each type of workers is exogenously given.
After having obtained the equilibrium in closed economy, I introduce a country which
differs from the domestic one either in total endowments or in preferences. Hence I open
to trade either sector one or sector two and I compare the newly obtained wages with the
autarky ones. The choice of which sector to open to trade is exogenous since I am only
interested into the effect of this choice. Indeed I retain it would be interesting adding the
19and one agricultural (numeraire) sector
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endogenous decision in the future research agenda.
I find that, when the economy has a higher share of workers with specialization two
over workers with specialization one, then the effects of opening to trade of the most
complex sector are the following.
The availability of a bigger market induces a rise in profit of firms in the open sector
(sector two), but, due to the zero profit condition, the firms must pay more the workers
they use. In particular, since sector two is the most complex, it will use all the two types
of workers, hence, both w1 and w2 should increase. At the same time, firms in sector
one, which did not experience the positive effect of trade, must now pay more the workers
they use since w1 has increased, but, this is not possible since they cannot experience
negative profit, therefore they must drag down the wage of workers one. The new level of
w1 will be anyway higher than before because since w2 increased, this led to an increase
of the overall demand of all goods, thus implying higher profits for firms in sector one too.
The overall effect of the forces described is positive for all types of workers with greater
positive effect for the most specialized ones.
When, instead, the least complex sector is open to trade, firms in this sector will
suffer because we assumed the domestic country to have a comparative advantage on the
most complex sector. This implies that firms in sector one must now decrease the wages
of those specialized workers they use, hence w1 must decline (again for the zero profit
condition to hold). This decrease of the wage of workers with specialization one could
have two effects on the wages of the most specialized workers.
More specifically, if the share of low specialized over high specialized workers is low enough,
then firms in sector two will now pay more the workers with specialization two since they
cannot experience the positive profit coming from the decrease of w1. Therefore we would
observe that the least complex globalization leads to an increase of the wages of the most
specialized workers and a decrease of the wage of the least specialized ones.
If instead the share of the low specialized over high specialized workers is high enough,
then the decrease of w1 will have a strong effect on the overall demand of all types of
goods, thus, also the profit for the firms in sector two will decrease, hence this will force the
firms to decrease the wage of the most specialized workers too. Therefore, this implies that
globalization in the least complex sector can produce a decrease of all types of workers’
wage.
In order to summarize the results, the model predict that opening to trade the most
complex sector produces a positive effect on the wages of all types of high skilled workers
with a stronger effect for the most specialized ones. Instead, the least complex global-
ization can induce either an overall decrease of the wages of all types of workers or, at
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the best, an increase of the high specialized workers’ wage and a decrease of the low
specialized ones’.
Going back to the empirical findings of the paper, the results are in line with the
prediction of the model when we observe exports effect. More specifically, I find that an
increase of exports in the most complex sector produces positive effect for the high skilled
workers with a stronger effect for the most specialized ones. Moreover I find that when
there is an increase in exports in the least complex sector, the average effect on the high
skilled workers is negative but, if we observe this effect more deeply, we find it is positive
for the most specialized workers and negative for the least specialized ones.
The empirical results on imports are also in line with the model. More specifically it
is reasonable to assume that increases in import in one sector reflect that, for that sector,
the domestic country does not have a comparitve advantage, in particular the share of
the most specialized workers over the least specialized ones in that sector is lower than
the rest of the world. This implies that, when opening to trade, according to my model,
the effects must be opposite than the ones observed before. This is exactly what happens
when you look at the results on imports.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the effects of Globalization, proxied by international trade, on
high skilled workers’ wage introducing two new sources of heterogenity among workers
and sectors.
I found that introducing sector complexity and skill ubiquity is relevant when studying
the effects of globalization on high skilled workers’ wages, moreover it appears to be rel-
evant also among the determinants of the wages.
An increase in exports of a sector has a positive effect on the wages of all types of high
skilled workers if that sector is highly complex, moreover this increase benefits more the
most specialized workers. Instead, an increase in exports of a low complex sector implies
a small increase of the wages of the most specialized workers and a decrease of the least
specialized ones’ wages, the average effect is a reduction of the workers’ wages. The effects
of an increase of import are the opposite of the ones found for an increase of exports.
Moreover, my paper suggests that working in more complex sectors implies higher wage,
being less specialized implies higher wage and this “low specialization” premium is de-
creasing with the complexity of the sector in which the worker works.
I believe that going further into the study of the role of sector complexity and skill ubiq-
uity on different international trade phenomena and on the determinants of wages could
50 Chapter 1. Empirical Analysis
be a new and interesting strand of research.
Chapter 2
Globalization and Wages: The role
of Sector Complexity and Skill
Ubiquity
The Theoretical Model
2.1 Model’s introduction
This model is a variant of Martin and Rogers (1995) with more than one manufacturing
sectors which are differentiated according to their complexity.
Differently from the paper, where the fixed costs are related to the capital necessary for the
production, I link the fixed cost required to produce a good with the good’s complexity.
As mentioned in the part I ’s introduction and in the first chapter of the thesis, this
paper introduce a theoretical background to the newly introduced heterogeneities among
workers and sectors. More specifically, not only this model considers the classic vertical
heterogeneity among workers (high skilled-low skilled) but it also allows the high skilled
workers to be horizontally differentiated through each worker’s specialization.
I model the complexity of a good using the number of different types of specialized
workers necessary for the production of that good.
Each individual can be either a blue collar or a specialized worker. If she is a specialized
worker, then she can hold only one specialization.
Since, as mentioned, each good differs for the number and for the types of specialized
workers required for its production, then, some specializations will be used in more than
one production process. Even though the model is analytically solvable for K sector and
K specializations, for simplicity of the analysis, this chapter describes the model with 2
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manufacturing sectors and 2 specializations.
The chapter is organized as follow, first I will focus on the closed economy and, after
that, I will open the border of the economy allowing different sectors to open to the
globalization, then I will study the effects of trade on the high skilled workers’ wages.
2.2 Closed Economy
Consumer Problem
In the country there are 2 manufacturing sectors and an agricultural (numeraire) sector.
Different varieties of the same good are produced in each of the two manufacturing sec-
tors, while the agricultural good is an homogenous one.
Each individual consumes the goods from the two manufacturing sectors and the agricul-
tural good in order to maximize the following utility function.
U =
(
Uβ11 U
β2
2
)α
U1−αA with α ∈ (0, 1) and β1 + β2 = 1 (2.1)
Where U1 is the Utility derived by the consumption of the goods in sector 1, U2 is the
utility from sector 2 and UA is the utility from the Agricultural Sector.
The overall utility function is then a Cobb Douglas function, hence the parameter α is the
fraction of total earnings the consumers are willing to use for the manufacturing sectors
while βi represents how much the consumers benefit from consuming the manufacturing
goods in the i sector with respect to all the manufacturing sectors.
Each consumer enjoys the consumption of a differentiated basket of varieties in each man-
ufacturing sector (love for variety) and her utility function for each differentiated sector
is a standard CES. The utility experienced by the consumers from the agricultural good
is instead linear in the consumption of the homogenous good.
U1 =
(∫ n1
0
c
σ−1
σ
1,k dk
) σ
σ−1
U2 =
(∫ n2
0
c
σ−1
σ
2,k dk
) σ
σ−1
UA =cA
(2.2)
Where ni is the number of varieties in sector i, ci,k is the consumption of variety k of the
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i sector and σ is the elasticity of substitution among varieties in each sector (σ > 1).
Each consumer maximizes her utility function, subject to her budget constraint, choosing
the optimal consumption level for each variety in each sector.
Thus the demand function for each variety k in sector i is the following:
c1,k =
(
p1,k
P1
)−σ
αE1
P1
c2,k =
(
p2,k
P2
)−σ
αE2
P2
(2.3)
Where pi,k is the price of the variety k in sector i, Ei is the share of the earnings the
consumers spend for sector i, which can be easily proved to be equal to Ei = βiE, where
E is the total earnings, and Pi is the price index for sector i with Pi =
( ∫ ni
0
p1−σi,k dk
) 1
1−σ
.
In the agricultural sector, the consumers spend a residual (1− α) amount of earnings to
buy the homogeneous good, thus, since the price of the numeraire good is equal to one1,
we can rewrite the demand function of the representative consumer for the agricultural
good as the following.
cA = (1− α)E (2.4)
This is true since the amount of earnings available to the consumer that she wants to
spend in the agricultural good is exactly the residual of the earning spent in the manu-
facturing goods.
Firm Problem
Two types of workers are present in the country, the blue collar workers (L) and the
specialized one (R), among the specialized workers there are workers with specialization
one (R1) and workers with specialization two (R2).
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive. The production of the agricultural
1because the agricultural sector is perfectly competitive with marginal cost of production equal to one
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good requires only blue collar workers whose productivity is normalized to one. Since the
agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and the blue collars’ productivity is equal to
one, also the wages of the blue collars are equal to one in equilibrium.
The manufacturing sectors are monopolistic competitive markets. Each firm in each
manufacturing sector must pay a fixed cost in order to hire (and mantain) the workers
with the specific knowledges required for the production of the manufacturing goods and
a variable cost for producing each unit of it.
. Each firm produces one variety in one sector and each unit of the variety is produced
using one blue collar worker.
In order to be able to produce one variety, the firm must hire specialized workers neces-
sary for the production, each sector has different needs and therefore requires a different
number of specialized workers.
The complexity of a good consists on the number of different types of specific knowledges
and therefore of specialized workers necessary for the production.
In the model, sector one is the least complex sector and sector two is the most complex
one, the former requires workers with specialization one and the latter requires both the
workers with specialization one and workers with specialization two. In particular, for
simplicity purpose, we assume each firm requires one unit of each of the specialized work-
ers necessary for the production in the sector.
The profits of the firms in sector one and two are the following2:
pi1 = p1q1 − q1 − w1
pi2 = p1q1 − q1 − (w1 + w2)
(2.5)
Where pi is the price of the goods in sector i, qi is the quantity of each variety produced
by each firm in sector i and wi is the wage of workers with specialization i.
Now we consider the firm maximization problem. Each firm maximizes her profit
choosing the optimal price level given the demand function of the consumers. The maxi-
mization problem is then the following.
2Each firm produces only one variety, since the firms in a sector are homogeneous I drop the variety
index
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max
pi
pii
s.t. ci =
(
pi
Pi
)−σ
αEi
Pi
(2.6)
Therefore the optimal price level is
p1 = p2 =
σ
σ − 1
And the optimized profit functions for the firms in the two sectors are the following.
pi1 =
αβ1E
n1
1
σ
− w1
pi2 =
αβ2E
n2
1
σ
− w1 − w2
(2.7)
Now we characterize the equilibrium. In equilibrium the free entry conditions, the
labor market conditions and the earning conditions must be satisfied.
The free entry conditions require the profit for the firms both in sector one and in two to
be equal to zero.
αβ1E
n1
1
σ
− w1 =0
αβ2E
n2
1
σ
− w1 − w2 =0
(2.8)
Then the labor market clearing conditions for both the labor markets for the specialized
workers and for the blue collars must be satisfied. In particular this implies that the
overall demand of workers must be equal to the overall fixed supply of them.
For the specialized workers we know that each firm in the manufacture sectors requires
one specialized workers of each type necessary in the specific sector. Thus, in sector one,
each firm need one worker with specialization one, while, in sector two, each firm demand
one worker with specialization one and one worker with specialization two.
This implies that, for the labor market of specialized workers to be cleared, the sum of the
demand of workers with specialization one in both the first and the second sector must
be equal to the fixed supply of workers of type one (R1) and at the same time, the total
demand of workers specialized in two must be equal to R2.
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{
n1 + n2 = R1
n2 = R2
(2.9)
⇒
n1 =R1 −R2
n2 =R2
(2.10)
The demand of blue collars is obtained summing up the demand of unskilled workers in
all the two manufacturing sectors (L1 +L2) and the agricultural one (LA). As before, the
total demand must be equal to the total fixed supply L.
L1 + L2 + LA = L (2.11)
We know that, in each manufacturing sector, the productivity of the blue collars is equal
to one, thus, in order to produce one unit of the variety produced by the firm, one unskilled
worker must be hired. This implies that the total number of blue collars workers employed
in one sector is given by the demand of each variety multiplied by the number of different
varieties in the sector. The demand of blue collar workers in the agricultural sector
depends on the demand of the numeraire good that is equal to (1 − α)E. Therefore we
can rewrite eq.2.11 in the following form.
n1c1 + n2c2 + (1− α)E = L (2.12)
Thus, applying (2.10) and (2.3) we can rewrite (2.12).
(σ − α
σ
)
E = L (2.13)
Another condition that must be satisfied is the earning one. In particular, the total earn-
ing is not exogenous but it is instead determined by the sum of the earnings of all the
population.
E = w1R1 + w2R2 + L (2.14)
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Therefore, in closed economy, the equilibrium wages, i.e. the wages that satisfy the
free entry conditions, the labor market conditions and the earning conditions, are the
following.
w1 =
αβ1L
(R1 −R2)(σ − α)
w2 =
αL(β2R1 −R2)
R2(R1 −R2)(σ − α)
(2.15)
Since I am interested in the scenario in which both the two sectors are active, i.e. when
there are firms producing in sector 1 and firms producing in sector 2, the values for which
both the two wages are non negative must be studied. Thus, I find that the condition to
satisfy is the following:
β1 ≤ R1 −R2
R1
(2.16)
We can rewrite the “non-negativity condition” also in terms of the number of firms in
each sector in equilibrium. In particular the condition can be rewritten as β1 ≤ n1n1+n2 3.
The preference of the population for the goods in sector 1 must be lower, in equilibrium,
than the share of the firms in that sector over the total number of firms.
From now on, the results taken into considerations satisfy the non-negativity condition.
Now I study the comparative statics, in particular, it is possible to rewrite the wages
as functions of the exogenous variables in the following form.
w1 = f(
−
R1,
+
R2,
+
L,
+
α,
+
β1,
−
σ)
w2 = g(
+
R1,
−
R2,
+
L,
+
α,
−
β1,
−
σ)
(2.17)
The formulation above implies that, while, as usual, the increase in the supply of one
particular type of workers decreases her wage, the increase in supply of the other type
of worker has a different effect. In particular, if R2 (R1) increases, then the wages of
workers specialized in one (two) increase. This happens because the increase in supply of
the workers with specialization two decreases the wage for those workers. This decrease
3or it is equivalent to write it as R1R2 ≥ 1β2
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in their wage allow the firms in sector two to pay more the workers with specialization
one and this the reason why we observe an increase in their wage. Instead, an increase in
the number of workers with specialization one, reducing the wage of those workers, allow
the firms in sector two to pay now more the workers with specialization two.
From the comparative statics we notice moreover that both the wages increase when
the number of unskilled workers increase. This happens because the increase in L produces
a further increase in the number of the numeraire goods sold and increases the available
total earnings that can be spent in the two sectors, thus allowing for an increase in both
the two wages. This could be thought as a market size effect driven by the unskilled labor
market.
The two wages are increasing function of their preferences parameter, in particular an
increase in β1 (β2) induces an increase in the wages for the workers with specialization
one (two) because it allows higher earnings to be used for the sector one (two).
An increase in α induces an increase in both the two wages because it implies that a
larger share of total earnings is now used for the manufacturing goods, i.e. for sector one
and two.
Finally the two wages decrease in σ. Since σ is the elasticity of substitution between
two varieties in the same sector, if σ goes to infinity, the varieties tends to be perfect
substitute, while as σ goes to one they tends to become perfect complements. This implies
that, if the varieties are more and more substitutes to each other, i.e. if σ increases, the
market power of each firm producing one variety decreases and so does also her profit.
Therefore, the decrease in the profit induces the equilibrium wages to be lower because
of the impossibility for the firms to pay the workers more.
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2.3 Open Economy
Now it is possibile to open the economy and to study the effects of globalization in sector
one or in sector two. In order for the normalization of the wages of blue collar workers to
hold in both the countries, we assume that the numeraire good is always tradable between
the countries without any frictional cost of trade. The manufacturing goods can be traded
between the countries, but the trade incurs in standard iceberg costs.
When a good is traded between two countries, the firm must pay a cost for the move-
ment of this good and this cost is modelled as an iceberg cost, i.e. in order to sell one
unit of good abroad, a firm has to produce τ > 1 units because τ − 1 units are “lost”
during transportation. Thus, the firm can now decide the price of her variety both in
the domestic (pi) and in the foreign market (p
∗
i ), hence it is possible to rewrite the firm
maximization problem in the following way.
max
pi,p∗i
pii =piqi + p
∗
i q
∗
i − qi − τiq∗i − Fi
s.t. qi =
( pi
Pi
)−σαβiE
Pi
q∗i =
( p∗i
P ∗i
)−σα∗β∗iE∗
P ∗i
(2.18)
Where Fi are the fixed costs payed by the firms in the i sector and are equal to w1 in
sector one and w1 +w2 in sector two. The perfect price indexes (Pi and P
∗
i ) are different
and must be rewritten in the following way:
Pi =
(∫ ni
0
p1−σi +
∫ n∗i
0
p∗i
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
=pi(ni + n
∗
i τ
1−σ
i )
1
1−σ
P ∗i = pi(niτ
1−σ
i +n
∗
i )
1
1−σ
(2.19)
Therefore the optimal prices set by the firms in sector i are:
pi =
σ
σ − 1
p∗i =
σ
σ − 1τi = τipi
(2.20)
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Thus, the optimized profit for the firms in sector i, when the sector is open to trade,
(respectively in the domestic and foreign country) is the following4.
pii =
αβiE
ni + n∗i τ
1−σ
i
1
σ
+
α∗β∗iE
∗τ 1−σ
n∗i + niτ
1−σ
i
1
σ
− Fi
pi∗i =
α∗β∗iE
∗
n∗i + niτ
1−σ
i
1
σ
+
αβiEτ
1−σ
ni + n∗i τ
1−σ
i
1
σ
− F ∗i
(2.21)
Since specialized workers are immobile across countries, the fixed costs payed by two
firms producing in the same sector and in different countries could be different since it is
related to the wage of each specialized workers in each country.
Fi =
i∑
j=1
wj
F ∗i =
i∑
j=1
w∗j
(2.22)
The last element to consider before completing the characterization of the open econ-
omy equilibrium is the agricultural sector. Since the agricultural good can be traded
without incurring in any trade costs and since the sector is perfectly competitive in both
the countries, we observe that pA = p
∗
A = 1 and that the normalization of the wages of
blue collar workers to 1 holds.
Therefore now I have all the elements to study the conditions required to characterize
the equilibrium in the open economy case. The conditions that must hold are the labor
market clearings conditions, the free entry conditions and the earning conditions.
In my model, specialized workers cannot move between the two countries, thus, the num-
ber of firms depends on the number of specialized workers, in particular:
ni = Ri −Ri+1
n∗i = R
∗
i −R∗i+1
(2.23)
4we can write them also as domestic (D) and foreign (F) countries profits: piD =
αDβiDED
niD+niF τ
1−σ
i
1
σ +
αF βiFEF τ
1−σ
niF+niDτ
1−σ
i
1
σ − FiD and piiF = αF βiFEFniF+niDτ1−σi
1
σ +
αβiDEDτ
1−σ
niD+niF τ
1−σ
i
1
σ − FiF
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Notice that, the workers in the agricultural sectors will clear the blue collar market since
they are defined as the residual of blue collar workers not used in the manufacturing
sectors.
Finally the earning conditions can be written as the following.
2∑
i=1
wiRi + L = E
2∑
i=1
w∗iR
∗
i + L
∗ = E∗
(2.24)
It is then possible to focus on the effects of opening a particular sector between the two
countries.
The paper will first focus on the identical countries scenario first opening the border of
the least complex sector (one) and then of the most complex sector (two), after that I
will analyze the case in which the countries differ in some characteristics and I wil study
the effects of trade on workers’ wages in these scenarios.
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2.3.1 Identical Countries
Globalization in Sector 1
The profit for the firms in sector one and two in the two countries are:
pi1 =
αβ1E
n1 + n∗1τ
1−σ
1
1
σ
+
α∗β∗1E
∗τ 1−σ1
n∗1 + n1τ
1−σ
1
1
σ
− F1
pi∗1 =
α∗β∗1E
∗
n∗1 + n1τ
1−σ
1
1
σ
+
αβ1Eτ
1−σ
1
n1 + n∗1τ
1−σ
1
1
σ
− F ∗1
(2.25)
pi2 =
αβ2E
n2
1
σ
− F2
pi∗2 =
α∗β∗2E
∗
n∗2
1
σ
− F ∗2
(2.26)
Since the two countries are identical5, the profit are:
pi1 =
αβ1E
n1
1
σ
− w1
pi∗1 =
αβ1E
n1
1
σ
− w1
(2.27)
pi2 =
αβ2E
n2
1
σ
− (w1 + w2)
pi∗2 =
αβ2E
n2
1
σ
− (w1 + w2)
(2.28)
The labor market clearing conditions are then:
n1 =R1 −R2
n2 =R2
(2.29)
Since in the open economy scenario, the agricultural good is freely tradable without any
trade costs, it it not needed to impose the total demand of the agricultural sector to
be completely satisfied by the production in the countries. This implies that, the total
number of blue collar workers in the agricultural sector (LA) will be the residual number
of workers not employed in the two manufacturing sectors, thus, allowing the blue collar
labor market condition to be always cleared.
Therefore it is then possible to study the equilibrium wages in the case of identical coun-
5α = α∗, βi = β∗i Ri = R
∗
i ⇒ ni = n∗i and wi = w∗i ⇒ E = E∗
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tries and globalization in sector one6.
w1 =
αβ1L
(R1 −R2)(σ − α)
w2 =
αL(R1(1− β1)−R2)
R2(R1 −R2)(σ − α)
(2.30)
In the very basic case in which R1 = R
∗
1 R2 = R
∗
2 L = L
∗ β1 = β∗1 (⇒ β2 = β∗2)
it is straightforward that the equilibrium wages will be identical for the two countries.
Moreover we find that in this scenario, the wages are not affected by trade, this implies
that they don’t change with or without the globalization.
If two countries, identical in every aspect, engage into trade, they will not observe any
change in the workers wages.
Different countries
The more interesting case is the one in which the two countries differ in one characteristic.
More specifically in the next sections I will discuss the effects of trade in each of the two
sectors if the countries differ either in their preferences or in the number of each type of
specialized workers.
2.3.2 Differences in Preferences
In this section the two countries are completely identical except for their preferences over
the two manufacturing sectors, i.e. they are different in β. More specifically the paper
will cover the case in which trade is available in the first sector and then it will focus on
the opening to trade of the second sector.
6it would happen the same if the sector opened to trade were sector two
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Globalization in sector 1
Allowing firms in sector one to trade between the countries will lead to the following free
entry conditions.
pi1 =
α
n1 + n1τ 1−σ
1
σ
(β1E + β
∗
1E
∗τ 1−σ)− w1 = 0
pi∗1 =
α
n1 + n1τ 1−σ
1
σ
(β∗1E
∗ + β1Eτ 1−σ)− w∗1 = 0
pi2 =
α(1− β1)E
n2
1
σ
− (w1 + w2) = 0
pi∗2 =
α(1− β∗1)E∗
n2
1
σ
− (w∗1 + w∗2) = 0
(2.31)
Finding the equilibrium wages for two specialized workers in the two countries allows to
study how they change with respect to their autarky level.
More specifically workers with specialization one (the least specialized workers) will ben-
efit from globalization if the following condition is satisfied.
β1 ≤ β∗1 (2.32)
Meanwhile the wages of workers with specialization two (the most specialized workers)
will increase if the following conditions are met.
if β1 < β
∗
1 and
R1
R2
≥ σ
α(1− β1)
or if β1 > β
∗
1 and
R1
R2
≤ σ
α(1− β1)
(2.33)
Therefore we can represent the effects of globalization in sector one on the wages of the
two specialized workers in fig. 2.1 and in fig. 2.2:
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Figure 2.1: Effects of Globalization in sector 1
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Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization one and two in the
domestic country if β1 ≥ β∗1 considering the case in which all the sectors are active. For further analysis
see Appendix B.1
Let’s study one by one all the possible cases and the related effects of globalization.
In the case in which β1 ≥ β∗1 (fig.2.1), the workers with specialization one will suffer
from globalization. This happens because the opening to the foreign consumers has af-
fected the domestic firms in two different ways, there has been an increase in competition
and an increase in the market size. Since the foreign consumers are less incline to spend
in sector one than the domestic consumers because β1 ≥ β∗1 , then the increase in market
size is overcome by the increase in competition and so the firms in sector one will end up
having lower profits. The free entry conditions imply that the firms have to pay less the
workers with specialization one and therefore this leads to a decrease in their wages.
At the same time, the decrease in the wages of workers with specialization one benefits
firms in sector two. This is true because those firms, which, because of autarky, don’t
experience the increase in competition, can now pay less the workers with specialization
one. The free entry condition of sector two implies that firms in sector two must pay more
the workers with specialization two, this is the reason why we observe an increase in the
wage of workers specialized in two in the fig.2.1.
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Notice that after a certain threshold of the ratio of the least specialized over the most
specialized workers, the wages of workers specialized in two start decreasing. This “eco-
nomic crisis effect” happens because of the effects of the reduction in wages on the total
earnings available to sector two.
In particular, the reduction of the wages of workers specialized in one produces a reduc-
tion of the total earnings available for both sector one and sector two, this implies that,
not only the firms in sector one will experience a reduction in their profits, but also will
do so the firms in sector two. Therefore, for the free entry conditions to hold, the workers
with specialization two must be payed less too.
In order to understand when this crisis effect takes place we must study the threshold
level. In particular when the ratio R1
R2
is high enough this second effect takes place, this
happens because, if the number of workers specialized in one is high, then the reduction
in their wages affects more the overall economy and thus the sector two too.
Moreover, studying the threshold level we notice that an increase in β1 increases the
threshold over which the wages of workers two are negatively affected by globalization in
sector one. This happens because if β1 is high, this means that the part of the earnings
used for sector two (1− β1) is low, in turns this implies that the greatest effect of the re-
duction of total earnings is on sector one rather than on sector two, therefore this implies
that it is required an higher ratio R1
R2
to trigger this crisis effect.
Now I study the effects of globalization on the domestic country when β1 < β
∗
1 (fig.2.2).
When foreign consumers are more incline to spend their earnings in sector one, it is easy
to observe an increase of the wages of workers specialized in one in the domestic country.
This happens because, as I clarified before, the competition effect and the market size
effect take place and thus, when β1 < β
∗
1 the market size effect overcome the competition
one allowing the firms in sector one to pay more their workers.
As before, the effect of globalization in sector one on the wages of workers specialized in
one has an impact on the workers specialized in two. In particular, since now firms in
sector two must pay more the workers in sector one, they must pay less the workers with
specialization two.
Again, above a certain threshold of R1
R2
, the effect on the wages of workers two changes,
in particular now workers with specialization two experience an increase in their wages if
R1
R2
is high enough. This “economic boom” effect happens because the increase in wages
of workers one produces an increase in total earnings and thus and increase in the profits
for firms in sector two which in turns are able to pay more the workers in sector two.
As before, the threshold is higher for higher values of β1 because, in order to trigger this
effect, a higher R1
R2
is required since the sector mostly affected by the increase in earnings
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Figure 2.2: Effects of Globalization in sector 1
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Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization one and two in the
domestic country if β1 < β
∗
1 considering the case in which all the sectors are active. For further analysis
see Appendix B.1.
is sector one (due to the higher β1).
It is also useful to make the comparative static analysis on the effect of globalization,
i.e. on the effect of an infinitesimal increase in trade costs on the difference of the wages
before and after globalization.
Studying the effect of an increase in τ on the difference between the wages of workers
with specialization one before and after the globalization, we find the following effect7.
∂(w1,after − w1,before)
∂τ
≥0 if β∗1 ≤ β1
∂(w1,after − w1,before)
∂τ
<0 if β∗1 > β1
(2.34)
7Studying the partial derivative of the difference between the wages after and before globalization is
the same as to study the effect of τ on the wages after globalization since the formulation of the wages
before globalization is not a function of τ
68 Chapter 2. Theoretical Model
Meanwhile the wages of workers with specialization two are affected by an increase in the
trade costs in the globalization one scenario in the following way:
if β1 < β
∗
1 then
∂(w2,after − w2,before)
∂τ
≥ 0 if R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1)
if β1 > β
∗
1 then
∂(w2,after − w2,before)
∂τ
≥ 0 if R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1)
(2.35)
From the above findings we observe that when β1 ≥ β∗1 the increase in τ , which implies
a reduction of the globalization of sector one between the two countries, produces an in-
crease in the wages of workers with specialization one. This happens because globalization
induces those workers to be worse off due to the already mentioned effects and therefore,
a reduction in globalization would benefit them.
At the same time, the effect of the increase in τ on the wages of workers with special-
ization two depends upon the level of R1
R2
. As I already mentioned, if β1 < β
∗
1 the wages
of workers specialized in two increase only after the threshold level of R1
R2
due to the eco-
nomic boom effect, thus, I find that an increase in τ induces a decrease in the wages of
workers with specialization two only if R1
R2
is above that threshold, otherwise a reduction
in globalization induces an increase of the wages of workers specialized in two.
Applying the same reasoning, if β1 ≥ β∗1 an increase in τ increases wages of workers with
specialization two only if R1
R2
is above the mentioned threshold.
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Globalization in Sector 2
This section focuses on the effects of allowing international trade in the second (most
complex) sector. As before, imposing the free entry conditions in the two sectors we get
what follows.
pi1 =
αβ1E
n1
1
σ
− w1 = 0
pi∗1 =
αβ∗1E
∗
n1
1
σ
− w∗1 = 0
pi2 =
α
n2 + n2τ 1−σ
1
σ
(β2E + β
∗
2E
∗τ 1−σ)− (w1 + w2) = 0
pi∗2 =
α
n2 + n2τ 1−σ
1
σ
(β∗2E
∗ + β2Eτ 1−σ)− (w∗1 + w∗2) = 0
(2.36)
Therefore, finding the equilibrium wages of the two types of specialized workers and
comparing the results with the previous (closed economy) level of them, I find that, if all
sectors are active8 then, the effects of globalization in sector two are represented in the
fig.2.3 and in fig.2.4
Figure 2.3: Effects of Globalization in sector 2
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Effects of Globalization in sector 2 for the wages of workers with specialization one and two in the
domestic country if β1 ≥ β∗1 considering the case in which all the sectors are active. For further analysis
see Appendix B.2
.
8see B.2 for calculations
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Figure 2.4: Effects of Globalization in sector 2
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Effects of Globalization in sector 2 for the wages of workers with specialization one and two in the
domestic country if β1 < β
∗
1 considering the case in which all the sectors are active.
1
1−β1 and
1
1−β∗1 are
the threshold levels under which we do not observe all the sectors to be active. For further analysis see
Appendix B.2.
In fig.2.3 the effect of globalization in sector two if β1 ≥ β∗1 is positive for both the
two types of specialized workers.
Since β1 ≥ β∗1 , this implies that β2 ≤ β∗2 , thus, the market size effect of globalization is
stronger than the competition effect for the domestic firms.
The increase in the market size for the domestic firms producing in sector two, induces
an increase in the profits of those firms and in turns, due to the free entry conditions,
both the wages of the two types of workers must increase. Here I don’t observe a different
effect for the two type of workers because they are both used in the most complex sector
which is the one that has been globalized.
Moving to fig.2.4 I find that for β1 < β
∗
1 the wages of both the two types of workers
decrease. This is due to the increase in competition in sector two for the domestic firms
which has not been overcome by an increase in the market size since β1 < β
∗
1 . Again here,
since the firms in sector two employ both the two specialized workers, they must reduce
their salary for the free entry condition to hold.
Now I study the effects of an increase in trade costs on the wages of the two type of
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specialized workers in this scenario.
∂(w1,after − w1,before)
∂τ
≥0 if β1 ≤ β∗1
∂(w1,after − w1,before)
∂τ
<0 if β1 > β
∗
1
(2.37)
∂(w2,after − w2,before)
∂τ
≥ 0 if β1 < β∗1
∂(w2,after − w2,before)
∂τ
< 0 if β1 > β
∗
1
(2.38)
Notice that here again the effect of increasing τ is linearly the opposite of the effect of
globalization. In particular when β1 ≤ β∗1 since globalization produces a decrease in the
wages of workers with specialization one and two, a decrease in globalization, through
an increase in τ , induces to a rise in both the wages. The opposite happens if instead
β1 > β
∗
1 .
In fig. 2.5 the results obtained in the already mentioned scenarios of the two sectors
opened to trade are summarized.
After focusing on the effects of globalization on the wages of the two type of workers
separately, it is useful to have a look to the ratio of the two wages. In particular, while
different papers in the cited literature focus on the “skill premium” meant as the share
of the high skilled worker’s wage over the low skilled worker’s one, I focus on the share of
the wages of the two types of skilled workers. Thus I study what happens to the “Spe-
cialization Premium” after globalization. For this purpose I compute the specialization
premium before and after globalization and then I study under which conditions it in-
creases or decreases.
Considering the scenario of two countries with different preferences over the manufactur-
ing sector, it is easy to prove that both with globalization one and with globalization two
the specialization premium in the domestic country increases if β1 > β
∗
1 :
w2,afterglob
w1,afterglob
>
w2,closed
w1,closed
if β1 > β
∗
1 (2.39)
Even though the model gives a clear condition under which the specialization premium
rises, the mechanism behind differ according to the type of globalization and to the dif-
ferent level of R1
R2
.
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Figure 2.5: Effects of Globalization in sector 1 and 2
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
10
20
30
40
50
R1
R2
b1
1
1 - b1
s
aH1 - b1 L
w1
w1 w2
w2
b1 ≥ b1*
w2w1
w1 w2
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
10
20
30
40
50
b1
s
aH1 - b1 LR1
R2
b1 < b1*
w1
w1
w2
w2
1I1 - b1* M
w2
w2w1
w1
Effects of Globalization in sector 1 (black) and in sector two (red) for the wages of workers with
specialization one and two in the domestic country if β1 ≥ β∗1 and if β1 < β∗1 considering the case in
which all the sectors are active.
Considering the scenario in which β1 > β
∗
1 , if the domestic country opens the border of
sector one, this will induce, for low enough level of R1
R2
a reduction of the wage of workers
specialized in one and an increase in wages of workers specialized in two which leads to
an increase in the ratio between the two (specialization premium). At the same time, if
instead R1
R2
is high enough, the economic crisis effect is much stronger for those workers
which are less specialized because, even though both the two type of workers observe a
reduction in wages, the specialization premium increases.
If instead the domestic country decide to open the border of sector two, both the wages
of workers specialized in one and two observe an increase in wages, but, this increase, is
asymmetric. More specifically the increase in wage of workers with specialization two is
higher than the increase of wages of workers with specialization one. Thus, the overall
positive effect of globalization two is spread unequally across different types of workers.
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If instead we analyze the case in which β1 < β
∗
1 , then inequality between the two type of
workers decreases. Again here the mechanisms behind this result differ according to the
type of globalization and to the level of R1
R2
and are the opposite of the ones analyzed in
the case of β1 > β
∗
1 .
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2.3.3 Differences in the least specialized workers
This section analyzes the scenario in which the two countries differ only for the endow-
ment of workers with specialization one (the least specialized workers), thus R1 6= R∗1.
Globalization in Sector 1
Globalization in sector one implies the following profit functions for the firms in the two
sectors in the two countries.
pi1 =
αβ1E
n1 + n∗1τ 1−σ
1
σ
+
αβ1E
∗τ 1−σ
n∗1 + n1τ 1−σ
1
σ
− w1
pi∗1 =
αβ1E
∗
n∗1 + n1τ 1−σ
1
σ
+
αβ1Eτ
1−σ
n1 + n∗1τ 1−σ
1
σ
− w∗1
pi2 =
αβ2E
n2
1
σ
− (w1 + w2)
pi∗2 =
αβ2E
∗
n∗2
1
σ
− (w∗1 + w∗2)
(2.40)
Firstly I study the effect of globalization in sector one on the wages of the two types of
workers in the domestic country9.
The wages of workers specialized in one increase if R1 ≥ R∗1 meanwhile, the wages of the
workers with specialization two increase under the following conditions:
R1 ≥ R∗1 and
R1
R2
≥ σ
α(1− β1)
R1 < R
∗
1 and
R1
R2
≤ σ
α(1− β1)
(2.41)
Therefore the effects of globalization one on the two wages can be summarized in fig.2.6.
When the number of workers with specialization one is higher in the domestic country
than in the foreign country the effect of globalization in sector one for those workers is
positive. In particular, when globalization of sector one happens, domestic firms in sector
one have the access to a bigger market and, at the same time, face higher competition.
Since the workers with specialization one are less in the foreign country than in the domes-
tic one, the firms in sector one are also fewer, this, in turns, implies a small competition
effect for the domestic firms.
9see B.3 for calculations
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Figure 2.6: Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization
one and two in the domestic country.
While the small competition effect reduces slightly the profits of the domestic firms in
sector one, the market size effect allows those firms to increase their profits. The overall
effect, in case of R1 > R
∗
1, is positive for the domestic firms which have now higher profits.
In order for the free entry condition to hold, it is then required an increase in the wages
of workers with specialization one and this is the reason why we observe an increase in
w1 if R1 > R
∗
1. The opposite reasoning works if R1 < R
∗
1, in this case the wages of those
specialized workers decrease after globalization.
Globalization in sector one has a different effect on workers with specialization two.
If R1
R2
≥ R∗1
R2
, the increase of the wage of workers with specialization one implies for the firms
in sector two a decrease of the wages of workers with specialization two. This happens
because the free entry condition must hold in equilibrium and thus, since the increase in
wages of workers specialized in one implies a reduction of the profits of the firms in sector
two, they must pay less the workers with specialization two in order to compensate this
loss.
From the fig.2.6 it can be noticed that, as it happened in the case of countries with
different β, the effect of globalization one on the wages of workers specialized in two
changes whenever R1
R2
is above a certain threshold.
In particular, when R1
R2
≥ R∗1
R2
, and if R1
R2
is high enough, the increase of the wages of workers
with specialization one has a huge effect on the whole economy. In particular, the overall
earnings are higher due to the rise of the wages of workers one and due to the high number
76 Chapter 2. Theoretical Model
of workers one with respect to workers specialized in two, therefore this economic boom
effect affects also the sector two through an increase in the profits of the firms in this
sector allowing them to rise the wages of workers with specialization two.
The same reasoning (but in the opposite direction) works when considering the scenario
in which R1
R2
<
R∗1
R2
. For low values of R1
R2
the reduction in wages of workers specialized in
one implies an increase of the wages of the other type of workers, instead, for R1
R2
high
enough, the economic crisis effect induces an overall decrease in total earnings and thus, a
decrease of the profits of firms in sector two too. The threshold level is affected positively
by β1 because the increase in the preference of the consumers for sector one implies a
delay of the effects of globalization in sector one on the workers with specialization two.
In the following paragraph I study the effect of an increase in trade costs on the wages
of the two types of specialized workers.
From the analysis of the partial derivative of the wage of workers with specialization one
with respect to τ , it can be noticed that, considering the case in which R1 > R
∗
1, even
though the wage increases with respect to the closed economy, the effect of the trade costs
is non-monotonic, in fact for high values of alpha and beta and/or low values of sigma,
the effect is positive, otherwise it is negative.
The opposite is true in the case in which R1 < R
∗
1, in particular, for low values of alpha
and beta and high values of sigma the effect is positive, otherwise it is negative (see B.3
for further analysis).
The wages of workers with specialization two experience a non-monotonic effect of τ too,
but this time, not only will the relative value of R1 with respect to R
∗
1 matter , but also
the relationship between R1
R2
and σ
α(1−β1) will.
In particular, for low alpha and beta and/or high level of sigma, globalization induces an
increase in the wages of workers with specialization two either if R1 > R
∗
1 and
R1
R2
> σ
α(1−β1)
or if R1 < R
∗
1 and
R1
R2
< σ
α(1−β1) . For the same levels of alpha and betas, an increase in
globalization induces a decrease in the wages of workers two either if R1 > R
∗
1 and
R1
R2
< σ
α(1−β1) or if R1 < R
∗
1 and
R1
R2
> σ
α(1−β1)
10.
The reason for these results is that workers with specialization two, when they benefit
from globalization, they will experience a u-shaped path of their wages with respect to a
function A(α, σ, β, τ) = (τ 2σ−τ 2)(σ−α)−2αβ1τ 2 which is increasing in σ and decreasing
in α and β. Meanwhile, if instead those workers experience a decrease in their wage with
respect to the closed economy scenario, the effect of globalization on the wage is inverse
10see B.3 for further calculations
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u-shaped with respect to the function A(.) (see fig. 2.7).
Figure 2.7: Effects of Globalization in sector 1 and 2
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Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization one (left) and two
(right) in the domestic country
As in the previous section, I study also the effect of globalization on inequality among
workers. In particular I find that the specialization premium is increasing due to global-
ization in sector one if R1 < R
∗
1
w2,afterglob
w1,afterglob
>
w2,closed
w1,closed
if R1 < R
∗
1 (2.42)
Studying the mechanisms behind this result it can be noticed that, if R1 < R
∗
1, under a
certain threshold of R1
R2
, there is an asymmetric effect on the wages of the two types of
workers (an increase in the wages of workers with specialization two and a decrease in
the wages of workers with specialization one) which leads immediately to an increase in
inequality due to globalization. If instead R1
R2
is high enough, the economic crisis effect
affects the workers with the lowest type of specialization with more severity. More specif-
ically, while both the two types of workers observe a decrease in their wages, this downfall
is stronger for those workers with specialization one and this is the reason why I observe
an increase in inequality after globalization.
Considering the scenario of R1 > R
∗
1, the domestic country experiences a decrease in in-
equality which is due to an asymmetric effect of globalization on the two types of workers
when the ratio of high-specialized low-specialized workers is low enough, and which is due
to an overall economic boom which benefit the workers with specialization one more than
those which specialization two if that ratio is high enough.
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Globalization in Sector 2
Now I study the effect of opening the borders of sector two in the two countries if R1 6= R∗1.
The profits for the firms in the two sectors in the two countries are the following.
pi1 =
αβ1E
n1
1
σ
− w1
pi∗1 =
αβ1E
∗
n∗1
1
σ
− w∗1
pi2 =
αβ2E
n2 + n∗2τ 1−σ
1
σ
+
αβ2E
∗τ 1−σ
n∗2 + n2τ 1−σ
1
σ
− (w1 + w2)
pi∗2 =
αβ2E
∗
n∗2 + n2τ 1−σ
1
σ
+
αβ2Eτ
1−σ
n2 + n∗2τ 1−σ
1
σ
− (w∗1 + w∗2)
(2.43)
The equilibrium wages after the globalization coincide with the wages before it. Glob-
alization in sector two does not affect the wages of the two type of workers which remain
equal to their closed economy level if R2 = R
∗
2.
This happens because the number of workers with specialization two in each country is
the same, this implies that, in equilibrium, the number of firms in sector two are the same
in both the two countries. Since now the only sector which is open is the second one,
the market size effect and the competition effect have an overall null effect on the wages
of workers with specialization two. Since workers specialized in two don’t experience any
change in their wages, then firms in sector two cannot change the wages of workers with
specialization one without breaking the free entry condition. In turn this implies that,
since the sector one is closed, workers with specialization one don’t experience any change
in their wages, therefore the overall effect of globalization appears to be null on the two
wages.
Concluding, I find that, either when two countries are identical or when the two countries
have the same number of workers with the highest specialization, i.e the specialization
used only by the most complex sector in the market, opening the border of the most
complex good does not affect the wages of the workers.
2.3.4 Differences in the most specialized workers
Finally this section studies the scenario in which the two countries have a different endow-
ment of the workers with specialization two (the most specialized workers), i.e. R2 6= R∗2.
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Globalization in Sector 1
The profits of firms in sector one and two in the two countries after the globalization in
sector one if R2 6= R∗2 are the following.
pi1 =
αβ1E
n1 + n∗1τ 1−σ
1
σ
+
αβ1E
∗τ 1−σ
n∗1 + n1τ 1−σ
1
σ
− w1
pi∗1 =
αβ1E
∗
n∗1 + n1τ 1−σ
1
σ
+
αβ1Eτ
1−σ
n1 + n∗1τ 1−σ
1
σ
− w∗1
pi2 =
αβ2E
n2
1
σ
− (w1 + w2)
pi∗2 =
αβ2E
∗
n∗2
1
σ
− (w∗1 + w∗2)
(2.44)
The resulting equilibrium wages for this scenario imply that workers with specializa-
tion one observe an increase in their wage if R1
R2
> R1
R∗2
and workers with specialization two
observe an increase in their wage if the following conditions are satisfied.
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1)
or
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1)
(2.45)
The effects of globalization in sector one are summarized in fig. 2.8.
When the number of workers with specialization two is lower in the domestic country
than in the foreign country, opening sector one produces an increase in the wage of work-
ers with specialization one and a non monotonic effect on the wage of workers with the
second specialization. This is due to the fact that the lower number of workers with the
highest specialization in the domestic country induces, in equilibrium, through the labor
market clearing condition, a higher number of firms in sector one in the domestic country
than in the foreign country. When the borders for sector one are open, the domestic firms
in sector one have to face a lower competition than the one faced by the foreign firms in
the same sector, thus, the market size effect overcomes the competition effect increasing
the profits of firms in sector one in the domestic country. The increase in profits of the
firms in sector one induces, due to the free entry condition, to an increase in the wages of
workers specialized in one. Contemporaneously, firms in sector two must now pay more
the workers with specialization one and thus, in order to not experience a negative profit,
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Figure 2.8: Effects of Globalization in sector 1
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Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization one and two in the
domestic country if R2 6= R∗2. For further analysis see Appendix B.4.
they must pay less the workers with specialization two.
This opposite effect of globalization in sector one on the two type of workers holds until
the ratio of the two types of workers in the domestic market is under a certain thresh-
old. In particular, for high enough level of R1
R2
, the increase of the wage of workers with
specialization one has a positive effect on the total earning so strong that now also the
sector two benefits from globalization because it experiences an increase in the available
domestic earnings (economic boom effect). The increase in profits of firms in sector two
allows those firms to pay more the workers with specialization two and this is the reason
why both the two types of workers experience an increase in their wage. If instead the
number of workers with specialization two were higher in the domestic country than in
the foreign one, we would observe a totally opposite effect than the one described above.
More specifically, initially the workers with the highest level of specialization would ap-
pear to win from globalization, but, when the ratio of R1
R2
is high enough the economic
crisis effect would pull down also those type of workers and, thus, both the two would be
worse off with respect to the closed economy scenario.
It is possible to further analyze the effects of an increase in trade costs on the wages
of the two types of workers after the globalization in sector one. If R2 > R
∗
2, i.e. if
R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
, the decrease of wages of workers with specialization one, respectively to the
closed economy’s level, is non monotonic, in particular, for low levels of β and α and/or
high levels of σ, the increase in τ , i.e. a reduction in globalization, induces an increase in
2.3. Open Economy 81
the wages, meanwhile for the same parameters level, if R1
R2
> R1
R∗2
an increase in τ produces
a decrease in the wages of workers with specialization one11.
Then I study the effect of an increase in τ on the wages of workers specialized in two.
I notice that the effect will now depend on both the relation between R1
R2
and R1
R∗2
, and on
the relation between R1
R2
and σ
α(1−β1) . For low levels of β and α and/or high levels of σ, the
increase in τ , i.e. a reduction in globalization, induces an increase of the wages of workers
specialized in two either if R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
and R1
R2
> σ
α(1−β1) , or if
R1
R2
> R1
R∗2
and R1
R2
< σ
α(1−β1) . In
the fig. 2.9 the effect of globalization in sector one and sector two are represented with
respect to the function A(α, σ, β, τ) = (τ 2σ − τ 2)(σ − α)− 2αβ1τ 2.
Figure 2.9: Effects of Globalization in sector 1 and 2
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Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization one (left) and two
(right) in the domestic country
Globalization in Sector 2
Finally this section focuses on the effect of Globalization in sector two if R2 6= R∗2. The
profit functions of firms in sector one and two in both domestic and foreign countries are
the following.
11see B.4 for calculations
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pi1 =
αβ1E
n1
1
σ
− w1
pi∗1 =
αβ1E
∗
n∗1
1
σ
− w∗1
pi2 =
αβ2E
n2 + n∗2τ 1−σ
1
σ
+
αβ2E
∗τ 1−σ
n∗2 + n2τ 1−σ
1
σ
− (w1 + w2)
pi∗2 =
αβ2E
∗
n∗2 + n2τ 1−σ
1
σ
+
αβ2Eτ
1−σ
n2 + n∗2τ 1−σ
1
σ
− (w∗1 + w∗2)
(2.46)
I study the effects of globalization two on the two types of wages in the domestic country
and, under the conditions for which the two sectors where active in closed economy I find
the following results12.
Both the wages of workers with specialization one and with specialization two increase if
R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
, and they decrease otherwise (see fig. 2.10).
Figure 2.10: Effects of Globalization in sector 2
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Effects of Globalization in sector 2 for the wages of workers with specialization one and two in the
domestic country.
12see B.5 for calculations
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Globalization in sector two allows domestic firms in sector two to compete with the
foreign firms in the same sector, thus, when the number of workers with the highest spe-
cialization is lower in the domestic country than in the foreign country, also the number
of domestic firms in sector two will be lower than the number of foreign firms in the same
sector. Therefore, from the point of view of the domestic firms in sector two, globaliza-
tion implies a strong increase in competition which overcomes the positive effect of the
increase in market size. The decrease of the profits of those firms implies, in turns, that
both the workers with specialization one and with specialization two must be payed less
than before in order for the free entry condition in sector two to hold.
Thus, the reduction of the profits for the domestic firms in sector two is the reason why
both the wages of workers with specialization one and with specialization two decline
when R2 < R
∗
2.
The results obtained from the analysis of the effects of globalization one and of globaliza-
tion two on the domestic country’s workers are summarized in the following graph:
Figure 2.11: Effects of Globalization in sector 1 and in sector 2
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Effects of Globalization in sector one (black) and in sector two (red) for the wages of workers with
specialization one and two in the domestic country.
Finally we study the effect of globalization on inequality in this last scenario. Studying
the specialization premium it can be easily proven that this premium increases due to
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globalization if R2 > R
∗
2.
w2,afterglob
w1,afterglob
>
w2,closed
w1,closed
if R2 > R
∗
2 (2.47)
More specifically the mechanisms behind this effect differs according to the type of global-
ization considered and according to the level of the ratio of the two type of workers (R1
R2
).
In the scenario where R2 > R
∗
2 (⇒ R1R2 < R1R∗2 ), globalization one induces, for low values
of R1
R2
, an increase in inequality among workers because of its heterogenous effect on their
wages. When instead R1
R2
is high enough the overall economic crisis effect is more harsh for
those workers with the lowest level of specialization and therefore the overall inequality
increases due to globalization. Globalization in sector two induces instead to an increase
in the wages of all type of workers, but the magnitude of this rise is different according
to the specialization level of the workers. In particular those workers with specialization
two experience a bigger increase in their wages than the workers with specialization one.
Therefore, after globalization, even though we observe an overall increase in all the wages,
we also observe an increase in inequality.
Focusing on the scenario in which R2 < R
∗
2, it is easy to show that inequality among
workers decreases. As before the mechanisms behind this result must be studied taking
into consideration the type of globalization and the ratio R1
R2
. Globalization one induces
an heterogenous effect among workers which, under a certain threshold of R1
R2
, benefits
workers with specialization one and worsens off workers with specialization two, thus,
decreasing inequality between the two. Instead, globalization of sector one induces an
overall economic boom effect when R1
R2
is high enough, this economic boom benefits more
the workers with specialization one inducing a decrease in inequality. Globalization in
sector two decreases both the two types of workers’ wages, but, this fall is much worse
for workers with specialization two than those with specialization one. This implies that,
also in the case of globalization two, inequality between workers decreases.
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2.4 Conclusions
The second chapter of the thesis consists in a theoretical model explaining the conse-
quences of introducing complexity and specialization into the analysis of the effects of
globalization on high skilled workers’ wages. I build a general equilibrium monopolistic
competition model with multiple manufacturing heterogeneous sectors each needing a dif-
ferent number, and type, of specialized workers. Sectors differ in the number and the type
of specializations they require for production and workers differ by their skill ubiquity.
The sectors needing more, and at the same time more specialized, workers will be more
complex than the others, the specializations required by more, and at the same time less
complex, sectors will be less specialized. I allow only for partial mobility of workers across
sectors according to the sectors’ complexity and the workers’ specialization. By means of
the model I study globalization impact on wages and most importantly, how this effect
would change according to the each worker’s specialization. The model suggests that
when globalization shocks sectors differing in complexity, it induces differential effects for
skilled workers. When the least complex sector is the only sector which is open to trade
it would lead to a rise of the wage of high specialized workers and a fall of the least spe-
cialized ones’ in highly specialized workers abundant country and, when the ratio of low
specialized-high specialized workers is high enough, the model results suggest that such
decrease will affect negatively also the most specialized workers. In contrast, when the
most complex sector is open to trade, it has a positive effect on both the most and the
least specialized workers. The results of the model are in line with the empirical results
described in the previous chapter.
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Part II
Reshoring
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Chapter 3
There and Back Again?
Heterogeneous Firms, Product
Quality and Reshoring Decision1
3.1 Introduction and Related Literature
The reshoring of the manufacturing production has recently gained a lot of publicity in
advanced economies. Although the aggregate offshoring trends do not seem to be yet
reverted2, the increasing number of firms choosing to transfer back the manufacturing
activities to their home countries caught the attention of both media and the experts.
Especially in the United States the public debate on the topic is very lively as the most
prominent examples of reshorers include General Electric transferring the production of
water heaters from China to Louisville, Kentucky3, Ford Motor Company shifting its
production of the newest EcoBoost engines from China to Cleveland4 or General Motors
moving the production of the next-generation Cadillac SRX from Mexico to Spring Hill,
Tennessee5. In his 2013 State of the Union speech president Obama stated: So we have a
huge opportunity, at this moment, to bring manufacturing back. But we have to seize it.6.
1This paper is joint work with Marta Paczos (University of Bologna)
2Oldenski (2015)
3National Public Radio, As Overseas Costs Rise, More US Companies Are Reshoring, January 27,
2014.
4Alisa Priddle, Ford Starts Building Newest Engines in Cleveland, Detroit Free Press, March 7, 2015
5Associated Press, GM Moving Cadillac SRX Production from Mexico to TN, August 27, 2014
6See State of the Union 2013 and also Economist article
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Despite broad public debate the academic discussion of the topic is scarce. Empirical in-
vestigation is suffering from lack of representative economy-wide data and relies on surveys
conducted within reshoring companies. Kinkel (2014) and Kinkel and Maloca (2009) re-
port the survey data for German firms, Dachs and Zanker (2014) report reshoring surveys
for eight European countries, Bailey and Propris (2014) and Pricewaterhouse Coopers
(2014) report on the reshoring trends in UK. The trends in US reshoring over recent years
are throughly covered by different consultancy companies reports: The Boston Consult-
ing Group (2011, 2013, 2014) and The Hackett Group (2012) with mixed conclusions on
the prospects of reshoring. Attempts to measure the importance of reshoring on aggra-
gate economy level are limited. Oldenski (2015) reports that in the period 1999 − 2012
imports by US-based multinational (MNE) affiliates were steadily increasing. DeBacker
et al. (2016) study MNEs activity for a number of advanced countries and check whether
there were any changes in the share of productive resources deployed in the home countries
of those companies. In the sample of US MNEs they find no evidence of an increasing
home share in employment, however they provide some evidence of a growing concentra-
tion of capital investments; they document this pattern also for some other high-income
economies.
In spite of the obvious issue of the representativeness, the survey studies provide some
interesting insights into drivers of reshoring decision. Kinkel (2014) report that 65% of
reshorers in Germany in the period 2010 − 2012 quoted quality-related problems as the
main reason behind production transfer. Similarly, EEF The Manufacturer’s Organiza-
tion/GFK (2014) reports that the main motivation of UK reshorers surveyed in 2014
was intention to improve quality, mentioned by 49% of interviewed companies. Thanks
to the access to a unique survey of American reshoring firms in the period 1995 − 2015,
we provide preliminary evidence for the importance of quality and technology upgrade
as the main drivers behind reshoring decision also for US-based companies. It turns out
that also within the group of US reshorers the quality-related problems are the main
push factor behind giving up on offshoring activity. Additionally, over 27% of those firms
quote innovation possibilities and skilled workforce as main pull factors for locating the
production back in US. Moreover, another 12% of firms quote access to skilled workforce
as important reshoring driver. In this paper we embrace this quality-related evidence and
we develop a novel theory that explains the recent growing reshoring activity.
To our best knowledge there is only one theoretical paper that generates reshoring pat-
terns. Baldwin and Venables (2013) analyze theoretically the location decision of a global
firm, separating between a sequential (snake) and a more separated (spider) production
processes. Location decision in their model is the outcome of the tradeoff between in-
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ternational differences in the production costs and the production co-location benefits.
Reductions in international frictions (trade costs, communication or coordination costs)
facilitate the relocation of production but can result in overshooting of offshoring and a
subsequent reshoring pattern. They do not consider quality choice in the production pro-
cess. Therefore, our approach to reshoring is complementary, as we put the quality-related
factors at the heart of our analysis. Moreover, we conduct the analysis in heterogeneous
firm framework, a margin which is absent in Baldwin and Venables (2013). This paper
also contributes to the literature by developing a theory for the offshoring and the quality
choice in the heterogeneous firm framework. To our best knowledge, Smeets et al. (2014)
is the only one paper that considers this question. However, the model developed there is
static and therefore does not admit reshoring possibility, which is in turn the core of our
analysis.
In our setting each firm is producing a single good for the domestic country market7,
deciding the quantity and the quality supplied as well as the factory location. We build
on Antoniades (2015), a model introducing the quality choice into seminal Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) framework and we enrich it in two steps. First, we add the offshoring
possibility. Offshoring is reducing wage costs paid by firms, but it is increasing the qual-
ity production costs and entails transportation cost for the components (iceberg type).
Introduction of the offshoring possibility into Antoniades (2015) leads to the following
findings: i) the most productive firms produce only domestically, ii) the least productive
firms offshore, iii) thanks to offshoring possibility some of the least productive firms, who
would have to otherwise exit the market, produce. Second, we extend the enriched model
into dynamic, two-period setting. High quality varieties yield higher revenues than the
low quality ones, yet quality production is costly. Firms would be therefore facing a choice
between setting a high quality upfront or smoothing quality upgrade across both periods.
Since the fixed costs of quality innovation are convex, firms will find it optimal to set a
given level of quality in the first period and upgrade it in the second period. Once we
allow for offshoring, some firms in the first period produce abroad. Yet given the second
period quality upgrade and increasing quality adaptation costs it entails, they transfer
the production back to the domestic country.
We solve the model numerically. The equilibrium delivers a sorting pattern: the most
productive firms always produce domestically, the least productive always offshore and
the firms with an intermediate productivity reshore. We discuss the crucial parameters
7We assume that the domestic and offshore countries are advanced and developing, respectively.
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affecting the equilibrium interval of the productivity for which reshoring arises. Compara-
tive statics exercises points the importance of the love for quality parameter. The increase
in the consumers’ taste for quality increases the intensity of the reshoring activity in the
equilibrium.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 presents some stylized fact
about US reshoring firms. Section 3.3 presents the static model, section 3.4 develops the
dynamic model and describes the solution method and the equilibrium outcomes. Section
3.5 concludes.
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3.2 US Reshorers: a brief view
Reshoring Initiative (RI)8 is a non-profit organization assisting US companies in reshoring
process. One of the core assets of RI is its reshoring database, in which the organization
collects the data on the events of reshoring among US companies from publicly avail-
able sources (press releases, companies white papers, media announcements, etc.) as well
as directly from firms, and verifies their accuracy. In June 2015 RI kindly shared this
database with us. Its full content covered 410 reshoring firms and another 231 classified
as kept from offshoring. Each record comprises company name, the year of reshoring,
the product reshored, industry classification and the main domestic and offshore factors
behind the transfer decision.
Table 2 in the Appendix summarizes the timing of the observed reshoring events. Al-
though there were occasional events of reshoring dating back to as early as 1995, the
majority of reshoring decisions were taken in post-2010, with a clear concentration in the
period 2012 − 2014.9. Figure 13 in the Appendix represents the sectoral composition of
reshored companies: it is clearly dominated by manufacturing industry, which coupled
with retail and wholesale trade, and professional services account for almost 90% of the
sample.
Probably the most important aspect of RI data are survey questions in which reshoring
firms quote the main drivers of reshoring, describing both offshore push factors and pull
home country incentives. Table 3.1 summarizes this information10. Although some firms
point to more than one factor (with the single top-scorer quoting 11 factors), the mode for
the number of pull and push factors is 1. Similarly to the survey-based reshoring evidence
in Germany and UK, the quality-related problems faced by offshore plants seem to be the
leading factor behind production transfer also for the American firms. The quality-related
factors comprise problems with necessary rework, warranty issues, low product liability
and alike. Overall, above 31% of the firms report quality problems followed by lead time
and inventory and freight costs (29% and 27%, resp.). Increasing wage costs are quoted
by 19% of firms. The prominent role of quality considerations is even more evident once
we limit the analysis to the group of firms who quote only one main driver behind their
reshoring decision (Figure 3.1): over 40% of firms point to quality issues with lead time
8www.reshorenow.org
9Observation in year 2016 refers to the firms that declared reshoring scheduled to take place in 2016.
10Note that in Table 3.1 the percentage do not sum up to 100 as each firm can quote one or more
factors. The percentage is expressed in reference to the total number of factors quoted.
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OFFSHORE FACTOR
% of firms
DOMESTIC FACTOR
% of firms
quoting quoting
Quality Issues 31,63 Technology and innovation difficulties 27,74
Freight costs 29,20 Other 20,19
Lead time, inventory 27,49 Skilled workforce 12,41
Wage costs 19,22 Government Incentives 9,00
Communication & audit 10,46 U.S. price of natural gas 4,38
Intellectual property 6,33 Customer/demand issues 4,38
Loss of control 5,35 Eco-system synergies 3,89
Other 4,87 Infrastructure 2,92
Ethical/green considerations 4,14 Lower real-estate/construction costs 0,97
Difficulty of Innovation 2,92 Supplier issues 0,49
Currency variation 3,89
Regulatory compliance 1,46
Political instability 1,46
Employee turnover 0,97
Image/Brand 0,24
Table 3.1: Main offshore and domestic factors behind reshoring decision for US firms
and inventory costs being second factor, mentioned in less than 20% of the answers; wage
costs are mentioned by less than 10% of firms. Complimentary to the quality issues dom-
ination in the offshore push factors, approximately half of the firms interviewed also point
to a limited scope for product innovation to offshore production as the main domestic
pull incentive for reshoring (Table 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Offshore factors behind reshoring in the sample of firms quoting one reason
only
3.3 Static Model
Prior to developing a full-blown dynamic model, we begin with a simple static framework
in which we can highlight the relationships between the quality choice and offshoring. We
base our setting on the closed economy version of Antoniades (2015) which we alter by
adding the production location choice.
Preferences The economy is populated with L consumers, each supplying one unit of
labor. The utility expression follows closely Antoniades (2015) and reads:
U = qco + α
∫
ω∈Ω
qcωdω + β
∫
ω∈Ω
zωq
c
ωdω −
1
2
γ
∫
ω∈Ω
(qcω)
2dω − 1
2
η
{∫
ω∈Ω
qcω
}2
(3.1)
where qcω and q
c
o represent the consumption of the numeraire good and the variety ω, and
zω stands for quality of variety ω. α and η capture the degree of substitution between each
variety and the numeraire, γ describes the degree of differentiation among the varieties.
Importantly, β is a taste for quality parameter. The inverse demand for each variety is:
pω = α− γqcω + βzω − ηQc (3.2)
Technology As in Antoniades (2015) a firm produces a given variety ω with inelastically
supplied labor input. Homogeneous good and labor markets are competitive. Upon
payment of entry cost fe, a firm draws productivity which determines their marginal cost
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c (distributed accordingly to G(c) on the support [0, cM ]). Firms that can cover their
marginal cost survive and produce, those with the lowest productivity exit the market.
The survivors maximize profits based on residual demand curve, taking average prices,
average quality level and the number of firms, N , as given. We allow firms to choose
the production location: they decide whether to remain and produce at home or whether
to offshore. For simplicity, we assume the extreme view of offshoring: once offshored, a
firm will offshore all its production.11 We formulate the total cost structures by closely
following Antoniades (2015), but we introduce a difference in total costs due to production
location:
TCHω = cωqω + δHzωqω + θz
2
ω
TCOω = wτcωqω + δOzωqω + θz
2
ω
(3.3)
TCHω and TC
O
ω stand for total cost of firm ω located in the home country and offshore
12.
The first terms of the total cost functions capture the variable costs of production as in
standard Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) setting. The second terms with parameters δH and
δO capture the increases in marginal costs due to quality upgrades. Those quality adap-
tation costs are brought about by the implementation of quality innovations. We assume
that the quality-related production costs are always greater for the offshoring firm (δH ≤
δO), i.e. the greater the geographical distance between the plants and the headquarters,
the more costly is quality adaptation. Those variable costs entail for instance machines
fine-tuning for the new technology processes, new materials, workers retraining, etc. The
third terms, involving θ’s account for fixed cost of quality innovation, invariant to quan-
tity produced. They describe firms’ R&D investments, product re-design, invention of
the new technology processes and so on. Following Antoniades (2015) we assume this
cost to be convex. In principle, we could allow for differences in θ’s across production
locations. However, firms R&D activities are predominantly located in the headquarters,
in particular if the main destination market is the domestic one, therefore we assume θ’s
to be equal across production locations13. Additionally, we assume that the total wage
costs are always lower offshore: wτ < 1.
11The model can be easily extended to a version where a firm combines a range of potentially offshorable
tasks in the spirit of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Each firm would then decide on the fraction
of tasks offshored. However, this complication would not qualitatively change the results of the model.
12Wage in the domestic country is normalized to 1.
13The earlier version of this paper assumed θH ≤ θO. The qualitative results of both the static and
the dynamic model are identical. The results are available upon request.
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In such a setting, the problem for a firm producing domestically is identical to the closed
economy solution in Antoniades (2015). Therefore, we solve the problem only for the
offshoring firm and present the equilibrium outcome.
Denote by cD,O the marginal cost value for which the offshoring firm’s demand is driven to
zero, qω(cD,O) = 0 and zD,O stands for quality level relative to zD,O. We can now express
prices and quantities as functions of cD,O, cω and qualities zω and zD,O:
pω =
1
2
(wτ)(cD,O + cω) +
1
2
(
zω(β + δO)− zD,O(β − δO)
)
(3.4)
qω =
L
2γ
(wτ)(cD,O − cω) + L
2γ
(β − δO)(zω − zD,O) (3.5)
piω =
L
4γ
(
(wτ)(cD,O − cω) + (β − δO)(zω − zD,O)
)2
− θ(zω)2 (3.6)
Next, we find the optimal quality level, z?ω, which is maximizing profit (3.6)
14.
z?ω = λO
(
(cD,O − cω)(wτ)− zD,O(β − δO)
)
= λO(cD,O − cω)(wτ) (3.7)
λO =
L(β − δO)
4γθ − L(β − δO)2
The last passage in (3.7) follows from the fact that for cω = cD,O ⇒ zD,O = λO((cD,O −
cD,O)(wτ) − zD,O(β − δO)) ⇒ zD,O = −zD,OλO(β − δO) ⇒ zD,O = 0. Given the optimal
quality, we can express (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) dependent on cω and cost cutoff cD,O:
pω =
1
2
(wτ)(cD,O + cω) +
1
2
(wτ)λO(β + δO)(cD,O − cω) (3.8)
qω =
L
2γ
(wτ)(cD,O − cω)(1 + λO(β − δO)) (3.9)
piω = (wτ)
2(cD,O − cω)2 L
4γ
(1 + λO(β − δ)) (3.10)
This results lead to two parametric assumptions. First, to assure concavity of profit piω
in quality zω it is required that L(β − δO)2 − 4γθ < 0. Second, in order to impose non-
negative zω we must assume that β > δO. Each firm, given its marginal cost cω, will be
choosing the location of its production by comparing the maximized profits under each
14As in Antoniades (2015) firms here choose simultaneously price and quality for a given output level.
Given linearity and separability of the model, we first solve for the optimal price and next, we find the
optimal quality level.
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of the scenarios:
piHω =
L
4γ
(cD,H − cω)2(1 + λH(β − δH)) (3.11)
piOω =
L
4γ
(wτ)2(cD,O − cω)2(1 + λO(β − δO)) (3.12)
As long as piHω ≥ piOω a given firm with marginal cost cω would prefer to produce
domestically instead of offshoring. We find that the pivotal firm that is indifferent between
producing domestically and offshoring is characterized by the following marginal cost c1:
c1 = cD,Owτ
(ΓH + ΓOwτ + (1− wτ)√ΓHΓO
ΓH + ΓOwτ 2
)
(3.13)
where ΓH =
θ(β+4γ−δh)+L(δh−β)
L(β−δh)−4γθ and ΓO =
θ(β+4γ−δo)+L(δo−β)
L(β−δo)−4γθ . It is easy to show that under
model parametric restrictions, it is always the case that c1 < cD,H < cD,O. Figure 3.2
represents the equilibrium location choices. Firms with the marginal costs below the cost
Figure 3.2: Static model equlibrium.
cutoff c1 produce in the home country, whereas firms with the marginal costs above this
threshold produce offshore. cD,H is the critical cost cutoff originating from the closed
economy model of Antoniades (2015), where firms with marginal costs above cD,H exit
the market. Introduction of the offshoring possibility results in a new critical cost cutoff,
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cD,O, cD,O > cD,H . This implies that thanks to offshoring we observe in equilibrium
some firms with very low productivity (with their marginal costs falling into [cD,H , cD,O]
interval) that without offshoring option would not be able to survive. Moreover, for the
firms whose marginal cost lays between c1 and cD,H offshore leads to higher profits.
The model is closed by free entry condition as firms ex ante expect zero profits:∫ c1
0
piHω dG(c) +
∫ cD,O
c1
piOω dG(c) = fe (3.14)
This condition determines the cost cutoff cD,O. Following Melitz (2003), Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) and Antoniades (2015) we assume that the firm cost draws are Pareto
distributed on the support [0, cM ] with G(c) =
(
c
cM
)k
. The cost cutoff in this economy
is:
cD,O =
(
4γfe(k + 1)(k + 2)cM
k
Lwτ((λH(β − δH)− λO(β − δO))ψ + ((4k2 + 8k + 2)(1 + λO(β − δO))))
) 1
k+2
(3.15)
(3.16)
where ψ =
(
(k+1)(k+2)(χwτ)k+2(k+2)k(χwτ)k+1+(k+1)k(χwτ)k+2
)
, χ is the constant
multiplying cutoff c1 (equation (3.13)) and λH =
L(β−δH)
4γθ−L(β−δH)2 and λO =
L(β−δO)
4γθ−L(β−δO)2 .
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3.4 Dynamic Model
Let us now analyze firm location decision in the two-period setting. Analogously to the
static formulation, offshoring comprises a tradeoff between lower wages costs and higher
quality-related production costs. The timing of the events is as follows: firstly all firms
pay the entry cost, fe and draw the marginal cost cω from the common distribution G(c).
Firm productivity is invariant across the periods. Next, given the realized value of cω
firms decide the quantities produced, the quality upgrades and the production location in
both periods. Finally production takes place. Each firm can choose to always produce in
the home country, always offshore, reshore in the second period or offshore in the second
period. Given the realized marginal cost, cω and the location choice firms experience
different marginal costs of production. They choose the profit maximizing scenario.
Denote by i ∈ {Home(H), Offshore(O)} a firm’s location decision in the fist period and
by j analogous decision in the second period. The joint profit for the ω firm reads:
Πi,jω = Π
i,j
ω,1+Π
i,j
ω,2 = q
i,j
ω,1(p
i,j
ω,1−cωT i−δizi,jω,1)−θi(zi,jω,1)2+qi,jω,2(pi,jω,2−cωT j−δi(zi,jω,1+∆i,jω ))−θj(∆i,jω )2
(3.17)
where qi,jω,1 and q
i,j
ω,2 stand for the quantity in the first and second period, z
i,j
ω,1 is the quality
level in the first period and ∆i,jω is the second period quality upgrade. The fixed costs of
quality innovation are convex and paid only on the per period quality upgrade (i.e. the
first period innovation cost is θi(z
i,j
ω,1)
2, whereas in the second period it equals θj(∆
i,j
ω )
2)15.
T i and T j are the payroll costs, conditional on location choice. For home production the
wages are normalized to 1, TH = 1. On the other hand, the offshore labor costs include
offshore wages (assumed to be lower than the home wages, w < 1) and iceberg cost of
shipping the goods back to home country (τ > 1) TO = wτ . Denoting the period by
t ∈ {1, 2}, the inverse demand function is expressed in the standard way:
pi,jω,t = α− γqc,i,jω,t + βzi,jω,t − ηQct with Qct =
∫
i∈Ωt
qc,i,jω,t dω (3.18)
As before, we can express the optimal quantities and prices, and the maximized profit as
15In principle the innovation costs are symmetric for both quality upgrades and downgrades, however,
in equilibrium the latter choice is absent.
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the functions of per period cost cutoffs, quality choices and the marginal cost, cω:
qi,jω,1 =
L
2γ
T i(ci,jD,1 − cω) +
L
2γ
(β − δi)(zi,jω,1 − zi,jD,1) (3.19)
qi,jω,2 =
L
2γ
T j(ci,jD,2 − cω) +
L
2γ
(β − δj)(zi,jω,1 + ∆i,jω − zi,jD,2) (3.20)
pi,jω,1 =
1
2
T i(ci,jD,1 + cω) +
1
2
(
(β + δi)z
i,j
ω,1 − (β − δi)zi,jD,1
)
(3.21)
pi,jω,2 =
1
2
T j(ci,jD,2 + cω) +
1
2
(
(β + δj)(z
i,j
ω,1 + ∆
i,j
ω )− (β − δj)zi,jD,2
)
(3.22)
Πi,jω =
L
4γ
(
T i(ci,jD,1 − cω) + (β − δi)(zi,jω,1 − zi,jD,1)
)2
+
L
4γ
(
T i(ci,jD,2 − cω) + (β − δj)(zi,jω,1 + ∆i,jω − zi,jD,2)
)2
+
−
(
θi(z
i,j
ω,1)
2 + θj(∆
i,j
ω )
2
)
(3.23)
In equations (3.19) - (3.23) ci,jD,1 and c
i,j
D,2 are the marginal cost cutoff values for a firm
making a location decision {i, j} in period 1 and 2, respectively. A firm with a marginal
cost cω, cω > c
i,j
D,1 (cω > c
i,j
D,2) will not be producing in period 1 (period 2). z
i,j
D,1 and z
i,j
D,2 are
the quality levels that are associated with marginal cost cutoffs ci,jD,1 and c
i,j
D,2, respectively.
While in the static model zD is zero in the equilibrium, in the dynamic model it is not
necessarily the case. This is the dynamic feature due to two period horizon combined with
the convexity of quality innovation costs. Consider a firm’s with marginal cost cω such
that it is equal to ci,jD,1 and lower than c
i,j
D,2: it does not produce in the first period, but it
produces in the second one. However, despite no production in the first period, it engages
in quality enhancing investments, as it would allow for the highest quality upgrade at
the lowest possible cost in the following period. As in the static formulation, the optimal
quality choice in every period can be found by maximizing (3.23) with respect to zi,jω,1 and
∆i,jω :
zi,jω,1 = Φi,j(β−δj)
(
L(β − δi)
λj
(
(ci,jD,1−c)T i−zi,jD,1(β−δi)
)
+4γθj
(
T j(ci,jD,2−c)−zi,jD,2(β−δj)
))
(3.24)
∆i,jω = Φi,j(β − δi)(β − δj)L
(
(β − δj)
(
(ci,jD,1 − c)T i − zi,jD,1(β − δi)
)
+
1
λi
(
(ci,jD,2 − c)T j − zi,jD,2(β − δj)
))
(3.25)
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zi,jω,2 = z
i,j
ω,1 + ∆
i,j
ω
Φi,j ≡ λiλj
(β − δj)(L(β − δi)− 4γθjλiλj(β − δj))
λj ≡ L(β − δj)
4γθj − L(β − δj)2
λi ≡ L(β − δi)
4γθi − L(β − δi)2
By imposing c = ci,jD,1 and c = c
i,j
D,2 in equations (3.24) and (3.25). We are left with a
system of two equations which enables us to express zi,jD,1 and z
i,j
D,2 as functions of c
i,j
D,1,
ci,jD,2 and parameters. Therefore, we can rewrite equations (3.19) -(3.25) as follows:
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qi,jω,1 = 2Φi,j(c
i,j
D,1 − cω)L(β − δj)
(
T jθj(β − δi) + T i θi
λj
− (β − δj)θjT i
)
(3.26)
qi,jω,2 = 2Φi,j(c
i,j
D,2 − cω)Lθj(β − δi)
(
T j
λi
+ T i(β − δj)
)
(3.27)
pi,jω,1 =
Φi,j(β − δj)
θi
(
ci,jD,2δiL(β − δi)θj
(
T j
λi
+ T i(β − δj)
)
+
+ cθi
(
T i
λj
(2γθi − Lβ(β − δi))− 2γθj(T i(β − δj) + T j(β + δi))
)
+
+ ci,jD,1
(
(2γθi + L(β − δi)δi)
(T iθi
λj
− θj(T i(β − δj)− Tj(β − δi))
))
(3.28)
pi,jω,2 =
Φi,j
θi
(
ci,jD,2(β − δi)
(T j
λi
+ T i(β − δj)
)
(2γθiθj + L(β − δj)δj(θi + θj))+
+ cθi
(
2γθj(β − δi)
(T j
λi
− T i(β + δj)
)
− βT j(β − δj)
(
4γθj +
L(β − δi)
λi
))
+
+ ci,jD,1(β − δi)L(β − δj)δj
(T iθi
λj
− θj(T i(β − δj)− T j(β − δi))
))
(3.29)
zi,jω,1 =
Φi,j(β − δj)
θi
(
ci,jD,1L(β − δi)
(T iθi
λj
+ θj(T
j(β − δi)− Ti(β − δj))
)
+
+ ci,jD,2L(β − δi)
(T jθj
λi
+ θjT
i(β − δj)
)
− cθi
(T jL(β − δi)
λj
+ 4γθjT
j
)) (3.30)
∆i,jω = Φi,j(c
i,j
D,2 − c)L(β − δj)(β − δi)
(T j
λi
+ (β − δj)T i
)
(3.31)
zi,jω,2 =
Φi,j
θi
(
ci,jD,1L(β − δj)(β − δi)
(T iθi
λj
− θj(T i(β − δj)− T j(β − δi))
)
+
+ ci,jD,2L(β − δj)(β − δi)
(Tj
λi
+ Ti(β − δj)
)
(θi + θj)+
− cθi
(T jL(β − δj)(β − δi)
λi
+ 4γθj(T
i(β − δi) + T j(β − δj))
)) (3.32)
In each period t firms with marginal cost cω above cost cutoff value cD,t will not
produce. They exit the market (i.e. neither engage in any production, nor in any quality
investments) if cω > max{ci,jD,1, ci,jD,2}. For the sake of clarity of the exposition from now
onwards we restrict attention only to the firms that are producing in both periods, i.e.
cω ≤ min{ci,jD,1, ci,jD,2}, for given {i, j} location choice. The entry of firms is unrestricted
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and firms enter until the expected profit is driven to zero.
Note that the maximum price a firm can quote is bounded and it is associated with zero
quantity produced. It also must equal the marginal cost, thus we can write the following
regularities:
ci,jD,1 =
1
T i
(
α− ηQ1 + (β − δi)
)
zi,jD,1(c
i,j
D,1, c
i,j
D,2)
ci,jD,2 =
1
T j
(
α− ηQ2 + (β − δj)
)
zi,jD,2(c
i,j
D,1, c
i,j
D,2)
(3.33)
where Qt =
∫
i∈Ωt q
c,i,j
ω,t dω, t ∈ {1, 2} and it stands for the consumption level over all vari-
eties in period t. As in our setup the only destination market is the home country market,
in equilibrium Q1 and Q2 are unique and common for all production location scenarios.
Considering all possible location choices, the equations (3.33) generate a system. Once
the system is solved, we can express all performance measures (3.19) -(3.25) and the max-
imized profits as the functions of model parameters and Q1 and Q2
16. We can write the
conditions that fully specify the equilibrium as:
Πi
?,j?
ω = max
i,j∈{H,O}
{
Πi,jω (cω, Q1, Q2; Θ)
}
(3.34)∫ c˜1
0
Πi
?,j?
1,ω (cω)dG(cω) +
∫ c˜2
c˜1
Πi
?,j?
2,ω (cω)dG(cω) +
∫ c˜3
c˜2
Πi
?,j?
3,ω (cω)dG(cω) +
∫ c˜M
c˜3
Πi
?,j?
4,ω (cω)dG(cω) = fe
(3.35)
Qt =
∫ c˜1
0
qi
?,j?
t dG(cω) +
∫ c˜2
c˜1
qi
?,j?
t dG(cω) +
∫ c˜3
c˜2
qi
?,j?
t dG(cω) +
∫ c˜M
c˜3
qi
?,j?
t dG(cω)
(3.36)
s.t. c˜k ≤ min
{
min
{
ci
?,j?
D,1 (Q1, Q2), c
i?,j?
D,2 (Q1, Q2)
}
, cM
}
, k ∈ {1, 2, 3,M}
where i?, j? are the optimal location choices. c˜k for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} are the profit cutoffs
between 4 potential location scenarios. c˜M is maximum value for the marginal cost. As
profit functions are convex, there are at most 3 cutoffs, however in equilibrium we do not
necessarily observe all of them. Πi
?,j?
k,ω (cω) for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} stand for the maximal profit
for a given interval of marginal cost and Θ stands for the model parameter set. G(c) is the
common cost distribution, assumed to be Pareto for productivity 1
c
, i.e. G(c) =
(
c
cM
)k
16To be found in the Appendix.
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. Equation (3.34) describes each firm’s optimal location decision {i, j} as the choice of
the scenario under which the maximized joint two period profit is the greatest. Equation
(3.35) is the standard Free Entry condition, bounded by the restriction to the firms
producing in the two periods (thus restrictions on c˜). (3.36) is the condition closing the
model, stating the aggregate equilibrium consumption levels of Q1 and Q2.
Because of the complex analytical form of the profit functions Πi,jω (cω, c
i,j
D,1, c
i,j
D,2; Θ) and
the large set of model parameters17 the model cannot be solved analytically. Instead, we
solve it by means of the numeric methods. The numerical solution procedure is based on
fixed point theorem. We proceed as follows: given a set of parameter values, we initially
guess the values of Q1 and Q2 and we find the relative profit-maximizing location choices
{i?, j?} for each cω ∈ [0, cM ]. Next, we compute the Free Entry condition (3.35) and verify
whether the guessed values of Q1 and Q2 overlap with their model-based counterparts,
i.e. whether (3.36) holds. If not, the guess on Q1 and Q2 is updated. We repeat this
procedure by iterating over the combinations of the parameter values.
We would assume, similarly to the formulation in the static model in the previous section
that a firm’s fixed cost of quality innovation is invariant both to production location and
timing, i.e. θi = θj = θ. As argued before, θ’s stand for the R&D-related quality invest-
ments, that are most likely to take place in the headquarters. Moreover, the reshoring
phenomenon does not address the re-location of R&D activities, but it is concentrated in
the component manufacturing business. Modeling the choice of R&D location is beyond
the scope of this model. Moreover, it is easy to show that in the dynamic setting firm’s
quality choice in the first period is always greater than the subsequent quality upgrade in
the following period. Therefore, if θ’s would differ accordingly to the production location,
firms would always choose to remain in the first period in the location offering lower fixed
quality costs. As a consequence, if the quality innovation costs are greater offshore, the
firms initially choose to produce domestically, build-up the quality stock in the first period
and finally offshore. We would not observe any reshoring activity whatsoever, which is at
odds with the data.
3.4.1 Equilibrium Results
The numerical solution delivers reshoring in the equilibrium. The equilibrium is charac-
terized by a sorting pattern into production location choices according to the individual
17Θ ≡ {α, β, δH , δO, η, γ, θH , θO, w, τ, L}
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firm productivity: the most productive firms (with the lowest marginal cost draws, cω)
always decide to produce in the home country, whereas the least productive (with the
highest marginal cost draws) always offshore. Reshoring arises for the intermediate val-
ues of productivity. For illustration, in Figure 3.3 we present one parametrization that
delivers a reshoring equilibrium. Firms within the area A choose production at home,
firms from the region C choose production offshore, whereas the intermediate productiv-
ity firms ( region B) are the reshorers. For the reshoring firms the first period benefits
from lower offshore wages outweigh higher offshore quality adaptations costs. However,
when the quality upgrade in the second period materializes, the quality adaptations costs
abroad rise as well and those firms prefer to transfer the production back to the domestic
country18.
Figure 3.3: Reshoring equilibrium illustration.
In Figure 3.4 we present the reshoring equilibrium sensitivity to the variations in the
taste for quality parameter (β) and to the degree of product differentiation (γ). When
the consumer’s love for quality increases two things happen (panel 3.4a). First, there is an
increase of the interval of productivity where reshoring is an equilibrium outcome, ceteris
paribus. Secondly, the equilibrium reshoring takes place for lower productivity firms,
ceteris paribus. Intuitively, as the consumers in the home country value quality more and
more, the scope for reshoring is also growing. The opposite effects happen for an increase
18Arguably, production transfer across countries can entail important fixed costs, from which our
framework abstracts. However, an introduction of fixed offshore or/and fixed reshoring costs would not
alter qualitatively the main results of the model.
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Figure 3.4: Reshoring equilibria. Comparative statics (I).
(a) taste for quality, β
(b) degree of product differentiation, γ
in the degree of product differentiation, γ (panel 3.4b). First, in the more differentiated
sectors reshoring is less likely to occur and more and more firms choose to offshore the
production in both periods. Secondly, in the more differentiated sectors, reshoring takes
place for more productive firms. Increase in the degree pf product differentiation depresses
all firms’ profits and as a consequence the firms invest less in the quality. Summing up,
the model predicts that reshoring should be more prevalent in the sectors characterized
by a lower degree of product differentiation and a higher taste for quality.
In Figure 3.5 we present equilibrium sensitivity to the variations in the quality cost struc-
ture. In the panel 3.5a there are plotted reshoring equilibrium changes due to an increase
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Figure 3.5: Reshoring equilibria. Comparative statics (II).
(a) offshore quality adaptation cost, δO
(b) quality innovation cost, θ
in the variable costs of producing quality, δO The reaction pattern is non-monotonic. Ini-
tially, for low values of δO ( when δH is close in value to δO) the reshoring activity is
more likely to occur, and it takes place for lower productivity firms. However, when the
quality production becomes very costly (for δO sufficiently higher than δH), the reshoring
interval starts to shrink and eventually it vanishes. Increasing the quality adaptation
costs decrease the net benefits from the offshore production, ceteris paribus. In the lim-
iting case, when the quality production is prohibitively expensive, we would observe only
the home producing firms. On the other hand, in the panel 3.5b there are plotted the
equilibrium changes due to variations in θ. It describes the cost of quality innovation, i.e.
the new design expenses, R&D outlays, the machinery replacement costs, etc. Increase
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in θ results in the reshoring activity being less and less likely to occur and taking place
for more and more productive firms. This is because rising θ reduces the net benefits
from the investments in the quality and depresses the profits for all the firms, but most
prominently for the home producers. In the limiting case, when the quality innovation is
very costly we would observe all the firms producing only offshore.
In Figure 3.6 we present the comparative statics exercise for wages, w (panel 3.6a) and
transport cost parameter, τ (panel 3.6b). Qualitatively, the impact of an increase in wages
or a rise in the transportation cost is similar, as those parameters jointly describe the ef-
fective unit labor cost of the offshore labor. Increase in w or in τ initially increases the
probability of reshoring. Also, alongside increasing w and τ , we observe less and less pro-
ductive firms transferring their offshored production back. However, when transportation
costs continue to rise, ceteris paribus the reshoring activity starts to decrease. Intuitively,
for very high values of transport costs and/or very high levels of offshore wages we would
observe neither reshoring, nor offshore production.
Figure 3.6: Reshoring equilibria. Comparative statics (III).
(a) offshore wage, w
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(b) transportation costs, τ
Finally, in Figure 3.7 we report how the reshoring equilibrium reacts to the changes in
the market size, L. Similarly to the impact of an increasing offshore wages and a rise in
the transportation costs, an increase in the market size results in the reshoring activity
taking place for less and less productive firms. As the market size grows, the scope for
quality differentiation increases19 and firms invest more in quality. These gains from
quality production are the greatest for the home producers (and their profit curve, the
blue dotted line in Figure 3.7, shifts the most). For large enough market size L the
reshoring activity disappears. In the limiting case, for very large values of L, we observe
all the firms producing domestically.
19The increase in the scope for quality differentiation leading to a higher optimal quality choice by
firms is one of the main findings in Antoniades (2015).
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Figure 3.7: Reshoring equilibria. Comparative statics (IV): market size, L
3.5 Conclusions
We present a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms choosing both the quantity and the
quality of the good and making a production location decision. Quality production is
attractive as consumers are willing to pay higher price for the higher quality good, yet
quality production is costly. Offshoring offers a way for reducing payroll costs, how-
ever it comprises quality production costs greater than the domestic manufacturing. The
model generates the equilibrium reshoring of production and yields an equilibrium sort-
ing pattern with reshoring arising for the intermediate values of productivity. The most
productive firms will always produce in the developed domestic country, while the least
productive ones will offshore. The second most productive firms will initially offshore,
exploiting the advantages of low quality - low cost production, coming back in the next
period producing, domestically, higher quality goods. We find that the region of equilib-
rium reshoring is particularly sensitive to taste parameter for quality, β. The greater the
taste for quality, the greater the chance for observing reshoring in equilibrium.
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Appendix A
A.1 - Data Info
In this section I report the distributions of sectors and majors over the years in our
dataset.
The database contains 1542989 observations of workers from 2009 to 2013. It is a
Pooled Cross section database.
The following plots describe the density of the field of graduation.
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The number of workers with each major in the years did not change a lot, as it can
be seen from the graph below
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The next graphs describe the distribution of the sectors in the data.
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Appendix B
Different countries
Different preferences
B.1 - Globalization in Sector 1
The conditions under which both the sectors were active in closed economy and are still
active after globalization are the following:
If β1 ≥ β∗1 then the conditions that must hold are R1R2 ≥ 11−β1 and R1R2 ≥ A(β1, β∗1 , σ, α, T ), if
instead β1 < β
∗
1 then the conditions that must hold are
R1
R2
≥ 1
1−β∗1 and
R1
R2
≥ B(β1, β∗1 , σ, α, T )
where
A(β1, β
∗
1 , σ, α, T ) ≡ α−α(β1+β
∗
1−1)τ1−σ+σ(−1+(β1−β∗1−1)τ1−σ)
(−1+β1)(−α+σ+(α(−1+2β∗1 )+σ)τ1−σ) and
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B(β1, β
∗
1 , σ, α, T ) ≡ α−α(β1+β
∗
1−1)τ1−σ−σ(1+(β1−β∗1+1)τ1−σ)
(−1+β∗1 )(−α+σ+(α(−1+2β1)+σ)τ1−σ) .
Notice that if β1 ≥ β∗1 , then A(.) ≤ 11−β1 and if β1 < β∗1 then B(.) < 11−β∗1 , thus, the
conditions can be rewritten in the following equations:
if β1 < β
∗
1 :
R1
R2
>
1
(1− β∗1)
if β1 ≥ β∗1 :
R1
R2
≥ 1
(1− β1)
(37)
In the figure 2.1 the values of the parameters are the following (but could be chosen any
other values, the results do not change) α = 0.35, β∗1 = 0.45, σ = 3.
In the figure 2.2 the values of the parameters are the following (but could be chosen any
other values, the results do not change) α = 0.35, β∗1 = 0.85, σ = 3.
B.2 - Globalization in Sector 2
If globalization in sector two happens, then, in order for all the sector to be active it is re-
quired that R1
R2
≥ 1
1−β1 and
R1
R2
≥ 1
1−β∗1
R1
R2
≥ A2(β1, β∗1 , σ, α, T ) and R1R2 ≥ B2(β1, β∗1 , σ, α, T )
where
A2(β1, β
∗
1 , σ, α, T ) ≡ α+α(β1+β
∗
1−1)τ1−σ−σ(1+(β1−β∗1+1)τ1−σ)
(−1+β1)(−α+σ)+(β∗1−1)(α−2αβ1+σ)τ1−σ) and
B2(β1, β
∗
1 , σ, α, T ) ≡ α+α(β1+β
∗
1−1)τ1−σ+σ(−1+(β1−β∗1−1)τ1−σ)
(−1+β∗1 )(−α+σ)+(−1+β1)(α−2αβ∗1+σ)τ1−σ) .
However notice that, if β1 ≥ β∗1 , then A2(.) ≤ 11−β1 , A2(.) ≥ B2(.) and 11−β1 ≥ 11−β∗1 and if
β1 < β
∗
1 then A2(.) < B2(.) and
1
1−β1 <
1
1−β∗1 and B2(.) <
1
1−β∗1 , , thus, the non negative
conditions can be rewritten in the following equations:
if β1 < β
∗
1 :
R1
R2
>
1
(1− β∗1)
if β1 ≥ β∗1 :
R1
R2
≥ 1
(1− β1)
(38)
Moreover, when I study the effects of globalization in sector two on the wages of the
specialized workers, I find that workers with specialization two will be affected differently
from globalization whether the ratio of workers with specialization one over workers with
specialization two is smaller or greater than σ
σ−αβ1 . Studying this threshold level it can
be noticed that it is always smaller than 1
1−β1 and moreover, if β1 < β
∗
1 it is also smaller
than 1
1−β∗1 , thus, I find that this threshold is always excluded by the non-negativity con-
ditions and this is the reason why it is not present it into the analysis of the effects of
globalization.
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In the analysis of the effects of an increase in trade costs on the two type of wages, I find
the following.
∂(w1,after − w1,before)
∂τ
≥0 if β1 ≤ β∗1
∂(w1,after − w1,before)
∂τ
<0 if β1 > β
∗
1
(39)
if β1 < β
∗
1
∂(w2,after − w2,before)
∂τ
≥ 0 if R1
R2
>
σ
σ − αβ1
if β1 > β
∗
1
∂(w2,after − w2,before)
∂τ
≥ 0 if R1
R2
<
σ
σ − αβ1
(40)
However, it is easy to show that if β1 < β
∗
1 , then
σ
σ−αβ1 <
1
1−β∗1 , thus, since for both the
sectors to be active it is required that R1
R2
> 1
1−β∗1 , then I must substitute
R1
R2
> σ
σ−αβ1 with
R1
R2
> 1
1−β∗1 , i.e. it is always true for all the admissible parameters.
Moreover it could be noticed that it is always true that σ
σ−αβ1 <
1
1−β1 , thus, since the
“non-negativity” conditions require R1
R2
> 1
1−β1 if β1 > β
∗
1 , thus, the condition
R1
R2
< σ
σ−αβ1
can never hold and therefore, the effect of τ on the wages of workers with specialization
two is always negative if β1 > β
∗
1 .
It is possible to rewrite the conditions for the wages of workers with specialization two in
the following way.
∂(w2,after − w2,before)
∂τ
≥ 0 if β1 < β∗1
∂(w2,after − w2,before)
∂τ
< 0 if β1 > β
∗
1
(41)
Differences in R1
B.3 - Globalization in Sector 1
The wages of workers with specialization one increase after the globalization in sector one
simply if R1 ≥ R∗1, instead the workers with specialization two observe an increase in their
wage if R1 ≥ R∗1, R1R2 > σ, R1R2 > σα and R1R2 > σα(1−β1) , if instead R1 < R∗1 then it increases
if either R1
R2
> σ and R1
R2
≤ σ
α
, or if R1
R2
> σ
α
and R1
R2
≤ σ
α(1−β1) or if
R1
R2
≤ σ.
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From those restrictions it is easy to proof that since σ < σ
α
< σ
α(1−β1) , they can be rewrit-
ten in the following way:
R1 ≥ R∗1 and
R1
R2
≥ σ
α(1− β1)
R1 < R
∗
1 and
R1
R2
≤ σ
α(1− β1)
(42)
Now I consider also the conditions under which the two sectors were both active before
globalization happened, in particular this is true either if R1
R2
<
R∗1
R2
and R1
R2
> 1
1−β1 , or if
R1
R2
>
R∗1
R2
and
R∗1
R2
> 1
1−β1 .
Moreover it is easy to show that 1
1−β1 <
σ
α(1−β1) .
Therefore we must only exclude our results below the area limited by the coordinates
( 1
1−β1 ,
1
1−β1 )
20.
When studying the partial derivative of the wages of workers specialized in one with
respect to τ I find that the sign will depend on two terms, (R1 − R∗1) and (α − 2αβ1 −
σ)τ 2 + (σ − α)τ 2σ which for simplicity it’s called term A(α, β, σ, τ).
A(α, β, σ, τ) can be rewritten also as (τ 2σ− τ 2)(σ−α)− 2αβ1τ 2, therefore since it is easy
to prove that (t2σ − t2) > 0, the function appears to be increasing in σ and decreasing in
α and β1.
∂w1,after
∂τ
= −κ(R1 −R∗1)((τ 2σ − τ 2)(σ − α)− 2αβ1τ 2) (43)
Since κ ≥ 0 and (τ 2(σ−1) − 1) > 0, then if R1 > R∗1 and A > 0, i.e. for low values of
alpha and beta and/or high value of σ, then the partial derivative is negative, otherwise
if A < 0 it will be positive. The opposite is then true for the case in which R1 < R
∗
1.
Since an increase in τ represent the reduction of the effect of globalization, then this
implies that, if being in the case of R1 > R
∗
1 then, for negative values of A, the global-
ization produces a decrease in the wages of workers specialized in one (still the wages are
higher than the closed economy case) because a reduction in the globalization allows for
an increase in those wages. The opposite is true for values of A greater than zero in which
globalization appears to increase the wages of workers with specialization one.
In the fig. B.8 and fig. B.9, are represented the effects of globalization on the difference
between the wage before and after opening the borders for workers with specialization
20in this framework β1 = β
∗
1
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one both when R1 > R
∗
1 and when R1 < R
∗
1 .
Figure 8: Effects of Globalization in sector 1
R1
R2
>
R1*
R2
R1
R2
<
R1*
R2
A
Dw1
Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization one in the domestic
country
Now I study the effect of τ on the wages of workers specialized in two.
∂w2,after
∂τ
= −κ2(R1 −R∗1)(−A)(R2σ − α(1− β1)R1) (44)
Since κ2 > 0, as before the sign of the partial derivative depends upon the term (R1−R∗1)
and A(.) but now it will also depend upon the new term on the righthand side of the
partial derivative above.
Thus, studying the sign of the effect of τ I get the following conditions.
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if
R1
R2
>
R∗1
R2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1) and A > 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
>
R∗1
R2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1) and A < 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
< 0
if
R1
R2
>
R∗1
R2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1) and A > 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
< 0
if
R1
R2
>
R∗1
R2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1) and A < 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R∗1
R2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1) and A > 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
< 0
if
R1
R2
<
R∗1
R2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1) and A < 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R∗1
R2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1) and A > 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R∗1
R2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1) and A < 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
< 0
(45)
Thus, applying the same reasoning we can represent the difference of the wages before
and after the globalization (w2,after − w2,before) in the following graph.
Figure 9: Effects of Globalization in sector 1
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Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization two in the domestic
country.
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Different in R2
B.4 - Globalization in Sector 1
After globalization one the wages of workers with specialization one increase if R2 < R
∗
2
and thus if R1
R2
> R1
R∗2
, while the wages of workers with specialization two rise if R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
,
R1
R2
> σ and R1
R2
≤ σ
α
or if R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
, R1
R2
> σ, R1
R2
> σ
α
and R1
R2
≤ σ
α(1−β1) or if
R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
≤ σ or if R1
R2
> R1
R∗2
, R1
R2
> σ, R1
R2
> σ
α
and R1
R2
≥ σ
α(1−β1) .
Since σ < σ
α
< σ
α(1−β1) , I can rewrite the above conditions under which the wages of the
workers with specialization two increase, in the following way.
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1)
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1)
(46)
The conditions under which the two sectors were active before the globalization must be
added into the analysis, thus, either R1
R2
> R1
R∗2
, and R1
R∗2
> 1
1−β1 or
R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
and R1
R2
> 1
1−β1 .
Moreover, since 1
1−β1 <
σ
α(1−β1) , then the analysis remain invariant, but in the graphical
analysis we must focus on the portion of the graph limited by 1
1−β1 .
Now I study the sign of the partial derivative of the wages of the two types of workers
with respect to τ .
∂w1,after
∂τ
= κ3(R2 −R∗2)A (47)
Thus, since κ3 > 0, I study the sign of A and (R2 − R∗2) in order to discuss the sign of
the partial derivative.
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and A > 0⇒ ∂w1,after
∂τ
< 0
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and A < 0⇒ ∂w1,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and A > 0⇒ ∂w1,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and A < 0⇒ ∂w1,after
∂τ
< 0
(48)
Thus, reminding that the increase of τ implies a reduction of the effects of globalization,
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the difference between the wages after and before globalization could be represent in the
following graph.
Figure 10: Effects of Globalization in sector 1 on w1
Dw1
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Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization one in the domestic
country.
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Moreover I study the effect of an increase in τ on the wages of workers specialized in
two.
∂w2,after
∂τ
= −κ4(R2 −R∗2)(A)(R2σ − α(1− β1)R1) (49)
Thus, since κ4 > 0 and (R2σ − α(1 − β1)R1) > 0 if R1R2 < σα(1−β1) , we can write the sign
study in the following way.
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1) and A > 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1) and A < 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
< 0
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1) and A > 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
< 0
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1) and A < 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1) and A > 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
< 0
if
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
<
σ
α(1− β1) and A < 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1) and A > 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and
R1
R2
>
σ
α(1− β1) and A < 0⇒
∂w2,after
∂τ
< 0
(50)
As before we can represent the changes of the wages of workers two after the globalization
with respect to before it in the following graph.
Figure 11: Effects of Globalization in sector 1 on w2
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Effects of Globalization in sector 1 for the wages of workers with specialization two in the domestic
country.
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B.5-Globalization in Sector 2
While the wages of workers with specialization one increase whenever R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
, for the
wages of workers specialized in two the conditions that must hold are the following.
If 1 < σ < 2 and R1
R2
> R1
R∗2
, it is required that R1
R2
< σ
σ−αβ1 and at the same time it
is also required that R1
R2
< min{R1
R∗2
1
σ−1 ,
R1
R∗2
σ
σ−α}21, if instead R1R2 < R1R∗2 it is required that
R1
R2
> σ
σ−αβ1 .
Meanwhile if σ > 2, then the wages of workers with specialization two increase only if
R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
and R1
R2
> σ
σ−αβ1 .
When I study all the admissible values for which both the two sectors are active in both
the countries, the equilibrium solutions must satisfy also the following conditions.
If R1
R2
> R1
R∗2
, then R1
R∗2
> 1
1−β1 , if
R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
then R1
R2
> 1
1−β1 .
Therefore it can be noticed that, since 1
1−β1 >
σ
σ−αβ1 , the conditions above can be rewritten
the following way: Both the wages of workers with specialization one and with special-
ization two increase if R1
R2
< R1
R∗2
, and they decrease otherwise.
Now I study the impact of a change in τ on the effect of globalization in sector two
on both the wages of workers with specialization one and two.
Notice that now the partial derivative of w1 with respect to τ is the following:
∂w1,after
∂τ
= κ5(R2 −R∗2)(α(τ 2 + t2σ)− σ(τ 2σ − t2)− 2α)β1τ 2) (51)
Thus, defining B(α, β1, σ, τ) ≡ (α(τ 2 + t2σ) − σ(τ 2σ − t2) − 2α) I study the sign of the
effect of an increase in τ and I get the following.
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and B(.) > 0⇒ ∂w1,after
∂τ
< 0
if
R1
R2
>
R1
R∗2
and B(.) < 0⇒ ∂w1,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and B(.) > 0⇒ ∂w1,after
∂τ
> 0
if
R1
R2
<
R1
R∗2
and B(.) < 0⇒ ∂w1,after
∂τ
< 0
(52)
Therefore, the effect of globalization on wage of workers with specialization one can be
summarized in the following graph.
21 if α < σ(2− σ), then R1R∗2
1
σ−1 >
R1
R∗2
σ
σ−α , otherwise if α > σ(2− σ), then R1R∗2
1
σ−1 <
R1
R∗2
σ
σ−α
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Figure 12: Effects of Globalization in sector 2 on w1
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Appendix C
C.1 - Information on the Reshoring Initiative Data
Full Sample Reshorers KFO
No. % No. % No. %
1995 1 0,16 . . 1 0,44
1997 1 0,16 1 0,24 . .
1999 1 0,16 . . 1 0,44
2001 2 0,31 1 0,24 1 0,44
2002 1 0,16 . . 1 0,44
2003 2 0,31 2 0,49 . .
2005 1 0,16 . . 1 0,44
2006 3 0,47 2 0,49 1 0,44
2007 6 0,94 4 0,98 2 0,88
2008 19 2,98 11 2,69 8 3,51
2009 32 5,02 19 4,65 13 5,70
2010 34 5,34 27 6,6 7 3,07
2011 76 11,93 41 10,02 35 15,35
2012 101 15,86 76 18,58 25 10,96
2013 185 29,04 108 26,41 77 33,77
2014 140 21,98 95 23,23 45 19,74
2015 30 4,71 20 4,89 10 4,39
2016 2 0,31 2 0,49 . .
Total 637 100 409 100 228 100,00
Observations 637 409 228
Table 2: The year of reshoring, different samples
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Figure 13: Reshoring firms by industry
Domestic factor % of companies
Technology and/or innovation difficulties 27,74
Other 20,19
Skilled workforce 12,41
Government Incentives 9,00
U.S. price of natural 4,38
Customer/demand issues 4,38
Eco-system synergies 3,89
Infrastructure 2,92
Lower real-estate/construction costs 0,97
Supplier issues 0,49
Table 3: Main domestic factors behind reshoring decision for US firms
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C.2 - Static Model Equilibrium derivation
Noticing that λk(β − δk) = L(β−δk)24γθk−L(β−δk)2 for k ∈ {H,O} and cD,O =
cD,H
wτ
:
L
4γ
(cD,H − cω)2(1 + λH(β − δH)) > L
4γ
(wτ)2(cD,O − cω)2(1 + λO(β − δO))
(c2D,O − 2cD,Ocω + c2ω)(
4θOγ
4θOγ − L(β − δO)2 ) > (c
2
D,O − 2cD,Ocω(wτ) + c2ω(wτ)2)(
4θOγ
4θOγ − L(β − δO)2 )
(c2D,H − 2cD,Hcω + c2ω)(
θH
4θHγ − L(β − δH)2 ) > (c
2
D,H − 2cD,Hcω(wτ) + c2ω(wτ)2)(
θO
4θOγ − L(β − δO)2 )
(c2D,H − 2cD,Hcω + c2ω)(ΓH) >(c2D,H − 2cD,Hcω(wτ) + c2ω(wτ)2)(ΓO)
where ΓH ≡ θH
4θHγ − L(β − δH)2 , ΓO ≡
θO
4θOγ − L(β − δO)2
⇔ c2ω(ΓH − (wτ)2ΓO)− 2cωcD,H(ΓH − (wτ)ΓO) + c2D,H(ΓH − ΓO) > 0 (53)
